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The regional police forces are seeing their budgets grow in a time of cutbacks in public
expenditures. Regional police forces have a great degree of autonomy in choosing how to
allocate these funds. The great degree of discretion makes regional police forces responsible for
thinking about what they want to achieve and the manner in which they will attain their goals.
Performance contracts could be instrumental in making these choices explicit. As such, they
could contribute to improved police accountability and incentives.
The nature of police work makes the application of performance contracts highly challenging.
Many questions still need to be answered. Can performance measures be selected that reflect the
quality and variety of police work? Can targets be set at the right level? Are financial incentives a
good way of rewarding efforts? These issues have been discussed in a range of research studies
and policy documents - particularly by policy makers and analysts in Anglo-Saxon countries. In
this study, Ben Vollaard reviews some of the existing literature in this area and applies it to the
current debate on performance contracts for the police forces.
We are indebted to the people listed in the annex, who were interviewed or consulted in
conducting the analysis. Several people kindly took the time to review a draft of the report, and
provided many useful suggestions on how to structure the analysis and how to present the
results. Special thanks go to Frits Vlek from the ‘Commissie Politie en Wetenschap’, Caspar
Wiebrens from the ‘Parket Generaal’ of the Prosecution Council, Oskar Huurdeman and Esther
de Kleuver from the Interior Department, and CPB colleagues Pierre Koning, Taco van Hoek,
Marcel Canoy, Richard Venniker and Marc Pomp. We owe thanks to Sam Loeb for linguistic
advice and to Simone Pailer for the lay out of the report. We would like to thank the Department
of Economic Affairs and the Institute for Humane Studies for their financial support.




In the beginning of 2003, the Secretary of the Interior, the Minister of Justice and police
administrators signed the ‘National Police Covenant’. The covenant states the way by which the
police forces will contribute to the national goal of reducing crime and disorderly behaviour by
20 to 25 percent over the next three years. As part of the covenant, performance contracts will be
signed with each individual regional police force by no later than July 2003. The contracts
establish financial rewards for meeting a number of quantitative performance targets. The
targets are related to output (fines, charges), citizen satisfaction, and internal performance
(including sickness absence and telephone response times). The expectation is that the
performance contracts will improve police accountability and incentives.
Concerns about police performance
In accordance with the government’s ambitions, the scarce empirical evidence indicates that
there is scope for improvement in police accountability and incentives. Data from the
prosecution council show great differences in performance between the forces. Moreover, some
poorly performing forces are not catching up. These findings indicate that there is room for a
more lively exchange of best practices between the forces.
Recent empirical studies provide indications that the overall performance of the police has been
declining. Crime clear-up rates have been on the decrease over the last 20 years, whereas they
have been stable or improving in other countries. The number of solved crimes per officer
(weighted with the respective penalty) has decreased over the last five years. When cleaning
police data from red light and speed camera tickets, the overall productivity of the police appears
to be on the decrease since 1990. These findings indicate that there is also room for a more
systematic improvement of policing strategies through carefully evaluated experiments.
However, based on the available data, we are not able to draw hard conclusions on the
background of the decline in measured police performance. Unfortunately, many of the rich
sources of administrative data of the forces have not been opened up yet. Consequently, little is
publicly known about the way police budgets have been spent or the results of police work. Is
the police unable to cope with changes in crime patterns and disorderly behaviour? Or are police
officers choked by an ever-increasing administrative burden and a lack of upstream capacity in
the criminal justice system? The lack of information on police efficiency and effectiveness alone
is an indication of the low importance attached to understanding and improving police
performance. 
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Performance contracts as seemingly attractive policy instrument
At first sight, entering into performance contracts with the police forces seems to be an
attractive way of improving their accountability and incentives. The rewards for meeting the
performance targets support the motivation to improve. The rewards compensate the forces for
the time and effort spent on evaluating operations and motivating employees to share and
implement best practices. Moreover, the rewards acknowledge the efforts of police officers and
managers who have to overcome (bureaucratic) barriers to change and the continuous, strong
pressure to respond to the issues of the day.
Proposed performance contracts not likely to be very effective
A closer look at the proposed performance contracts learns that they are not likely to be very
effective in achieving verifiable improvements in police performance. We base this conclusion
on the following findings:
• Fixing desirable improvements into a contract invites the forces to ‘meet the numbers’ at the cost of
quality of police work. The performance contracts allow for several ways of achieving the targets,
many of which are not in line with the government’s objectives. If the forces are expected to
react to the (financial) incentives, then paying off for behaviour other than what the government
is seeking undermines the effectiveness of performance contracts. The contracts reward the
forces for substituting away from tasks that do not affect the performance measures to tasks that
do (at the possible cost of pro-active crime prevention). Within activities that affect the measures,
the contracts also pay off for lowering the quality of output (frivolous fining, picking the easiest
criminal charges, producing charges with questionable evidence). These are all easy and
therefore tempting ways of meeting the targets.
• Fixing levels of output conflicts with the need to respond to changing regional circumstances. By
putting the desired number of fines and charges in a contract, they are made independent of
changes in the nature and frequency of criminal and disorderly behaviour. The targets limit the
responsiveness of regional police forces to changes in their environment. Therefore, the
demands of the performance contracts and reality may well start to deviate. Clearly, this is not in
the interest of effective policing.
• The government does not have the data to set the performance targets at the right level. In the absence
of any firm knowledge about the means by which the targets can be achieved, each target
included in the performance contract is likely to be either out of reach or too little ambitious.
Detailed information on business processes and regional circumstances is lacking. Back-of-the-
envelop calculations indicate that the targets for the number fines and charges are little
ambitious - certainly given the future increase in the number of police officers. The goals for
customer satisfaction may also be little ambitious since they are based on the own historical 
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performance (‘perform at least as good as you did in the past’). If the targets are set too low, the
force may stop their efforts as soon as the target is reached (‘satisficing behaviour’).
• The performance targets conflict with the wish for flexibility at the national level. Frequently, the
government places new demands on the police forces. These changing policy priorities may well
make the performance targets obsolete. When anticipating on future changes, the forces would
have little incentive to meet the current targets. Furthermore, negative experiences with some of
the performance measures may prompt the government to change the terms of contract. Such
changes are not unthinkable given the inexperience with this policy instrument. Altering the
method of measuring and rewarding performance along the way does not support the forces’
incentives either.
• The financial rewards could provoke undesirable biases in police work. Awarding the financial reward
requires a yes/no decision based on weighing multiple performance measures. It is hard to
replace subjective judgement with mechanical rules, however. The government does not have
the data to choose the appropriate weights. When the weights included in the decision rules are
picked wrong, undesirable biases in police work may result. The forces can be expected to look
for the target that can be achieved with the least effort and the greatest reward.
• The financial rewards conflict with the lack of consumer choice. By not increasing the budgets of
forces that did not sufficiently improve their performance, citizens pay twice for poor police
management within their region. In contrast with schools and hospitals, citizens cannot switch
to a better performing force other than by moving somewhere else.
Some of the shortcomings can be alleviated...
The performance contracts could made more effective by making changes. Some of the options
are:
• Search for better performance indicators. Better measures could limit the side effects and lower the
conflict with flexibility at the regional level. Of all measures included in the contract, the output
measures number of fines and number of charges most strongly invite the forces to just ‘meet
the numbers’. They also limit the discretion of the forces most strongly. An option is not to
include the number of fines in the contract. The charges can be weighted with their respective
penalty. Then the forces no longer have the incentive to focus on the easiest cases.
• Tie financial incentives to police managers’ remuneration rather than the forces’ budgets. That way,
customers of police services will no longer pay twice for poor police performance.
• Gather better data to improve target setting. Better data on how the forces spend their resources
and what outputs are produced are necessary to make a better informed guess on what the
targets should be. To that end, the rich sources of administrative data of the forces would need
to be opened up. 
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... but there remain serious drawbacks to the use of performance contracts
Also with these changes, there remain serious drawbacks to the use of performance contracts.
The need to react to changing regional and national circumstances will always make it hard to
contract police output in advance. Setting targets at the right level requires a level of knowledge
about the specifics of police work and regional circumstances that is unlikely to be present at the
national level. Furthermore, the quality and variety of police work is just hard to capture in
quantitative performance measures. Therefore, the performance measures will always allow for
ways of meeting the targets that are not in line with the government’s objectives.
Towards an alternative approach: organizing accountability to customers and peers
Considering the serious drawbacks related to the contractual approach, it is worthwhile to look
across the borders for alternative ways of achieving the government’s objectives. Australia and
the United Kingdom are two countries that have been working on greater police accountability
and incentives for a long time. Interestingly, in these countries experts have been closely
involved in the design of policies towards the police. Neither Australia nor the United Kingdom
have opted for performance contracts with financial incentives for the forces. Instead their
prime focus is on benchmarking the police forces. Many years have been invested in improving
the reliability of police data and methods of benchmarking forces in a fair and meaningful way.
A similar approach could be worked out for the Dutch police. In that case, the role of the
national government is not to put down desired changes in a contract but to organize
accountability to customers and peers. The outcomes of evaluations by customers and peers
from other forces can be an input into decisions about promotion and remuneration of a force’s
management. Customers and peers are in the best position to assess performance - and to
provide ideas for improvement. Customers not only include citizens currently surveyed through
the Citizen Police Monitor (PMB), but also businesses and public prosecutors. Managed peer
reviews are a necessary mean to conduct a thorough and comprehensive assessment of policing
strategies. Through peer reviews, the management of each police force is forced to develop and
present a coherent picture of the problems in their region, their strategy to tackle these
problems, and the results relative to other forces. This approach of ‘organized accountability’
could contribute to a culture within the police of systematically following, evaluating and
improving performance. 
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Samenvatting (summary in Dutch)
Begin 2003 tekenden de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijkrelaties, de Minister
van Justitie en de korpsbeheerders het ‘Nationaal Politie Convenant’. Het convenant geeft aan
welke bijdrage de politie zal leveren aan de nationale doelstelling een vermindering te bereiken
in crimineel en orde verstorend gedrag van 20 to 25 procent over de komende drie jaar. Als
onderdeel van het convenant sluit de overheid vóór juli 2003 prestatiecontracten af met elk
regionaal politiekorps. In de contracten staat dat de korpsen een financiële beloning zullen
ontvangen als zij een aantal kwantitatieve doelstellingen behalen. De afspraken betreffen
productie (bekeuringen, zaken naar Openbaar Ministerie), tevredenheid van burgers en interne
organisatie (onder andere ziekteverzuim en snelheid van telefonische beantwoording). De
verwachting is dat de prestatiecontracten zullen bijdragen aan de prestatieprikkels voor en
verantwoording door de politiekorpsen.
Zorgen over politieprestaties
De resultaten van het weinige beschikbare empirische onderzoek geven aan dat er ruimte is voor
verbetering in prestatieprikkels en verantwoording. Gegevens van het Openbaar Ministerie laten
grote verschillen zien in de prestaties van de korpsen. Bovendien halen sommige minder
presterende korpsen hun achterstand niet in. Deze bevindingen vormen een aanwijzing dat er
ruimte bestaat voor een meer levendige uitwisseling van best practices tussen de korpsen.
Ook laten recente empirische studies een daling zien in de prestatie van de politie. Over de
afgelopen 20 jaar zijn de ophelderingspercentages voortdurend gedaald, terwijl ze stabiel waren
of zelfs verbeterden in andere landen. Het aantal opgehelderde misdrijven per agent (gewogen
met de bijbehorende straf) is gedaald over de laatste vijf jaar. Wanneer politiegegevens
geschoond worden voor flitspaal-boetes blijkt de productiviteit van de politie sinds 1990 te
dalen. Deze resultaten geven een indicatie dat er ruimte is voor een meer systematische aanpak
van het verbeteren van de prestatie met behulp van zorgvuldig geëvalueerde experimenten.
Op basis van de beschikbare gegevens kunnen we echter geen harde conclusies trekken over de
precieze achtergrond van de gemeten daling in politieprestaties. Helaas zijn de rijke bronnen
van administratieve gegevens van de korpsen nog niet goed toegankelijk. Hierdoor is
publiekelijk weinig bekend over de manier waarop de budgetten worden besteed of over de
resultaten van politiewerk. Is de politie niet in staat veranderingen in criminaliteit en orde
verstorend gedrag bij te houden? Of zijn politieagenten verstikt in een voortdurend groeiende
administratieve rompslomp en een gebrek aan capaciteit hoger in de strafrechtketen? Het
gebrek aan informatie over efficiëntie en effectiviteit van de politie is zelf al een indicatie van het
lage belang dat gehecht wordt aan het begrijpen en verbeteren van de prestatie van de politie. 
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Prestatiecontracten als een schijnbaar aantrekkelijk beleidsinstrument
Op het eerste gezicht lijkt het afsluiten van prestatiecontracten met de regiokorpsen een
aantrekkelijke manier om de verantwoording en prikkels te versterken. De prestatiebeloning
ondersteunt de motivatie om te verbeteren. De beloning compenseert de korpsen voor de tijd en
inspanningen die gaan zitten in het evalueren van hun optreden en het motiveren van agenten
om best practices te delen en te implementeren. Bovendien vormt de beloning een erkenning van
de inspanningen van agenten en managers die nodig zijn om de (bureaucratische) barrières
tegen verandering en de waan van de dag te doorbreken.
Voorgestelde prestatiecontracten zijn waarschijnlijk weinig effectief
Een nadere analyse van de voorgestelde prestatiecontracten geeft aan dat zij waarschijnlijk
weinig effectief zijn in het bereiken van aantoonbare verbeteringen van de veiligheid. Wij
baseren deze conclusie op de volgende bevindingen:
• Het vastleggen van gewenste verbeteringen in een contract nodigt uit tot een gerichtheid op cijfertjes die
ten koste gaat van de kwaliteit van politiewerk. De contracten laten ruimte voor vele manieren om
de prestatieafspraken te behalen. Niet alle manieren zijn in lijn met de doelstellingen van de
overheid. Als van de korpsen verwacht wordt dat zij reageren op (financiële) prikkels, dan
ondermijnt het belonen van zulk gedrag de effectiviteit van prestatiecontracten. De contracten
belonen de korpsen voor het substitueren van taken die niet tot uitdrukking komen in de
prestatiemaatstaven naar taken die dat wel doen (mogelijkerwijs ten koste van actieve
misdaadpreventie). Binnen activiteiten die de prestatiemaatstaven beïnvloeden, belonen de
contracten ook het verlagen van de kwaliteit van de productie (pietluttig bekeuren, de
eenvoudigste zaken oppakken en het doorsturen van zaken met twijfelachtig bewijs). Dit zijn
allemaal eenvoudige en daarom verleidelijke manieren om de prestatieafspraken te behalen.
• Het vastleggen van te leveren productie rijmt niet met de noodzaak om te reageren op veranderende
regionale omstandigheden. Door het gewenste aantal bekeuringen en zaken in een contract vast te
leggen worden deze grootheden onafhankelijk gemaakt van de aard en het niveau van crimineel
en orde verstorend gedrag. De prestatieafspraken beperken dus de mogelijkheid van de korpsen
om te reageren op veranderingen in hun omgeving. Hierdoor kunnen de eisen van de
prestatiecontracten en de werkelijkheid uit elkaar gaan lopen. Dit is natuurlijk niet in het belang
van effectief politiewerk.
• De overheid kan vanwege een gebrek aan informatie het ambitieniveau van de afspraken niet goed
inschatten. Zonder goede informatie over de middelen waarmee de prestatieafspraken zijn te
bereiken, is iedere doelstelling in het prestatiecontract waarschijnlijk óf buiten bereik óf te
weinig ambitieus. Er is een gebrek aan gedetailleerde informatie over bedrijfsprocessen en
regionale omstandigheden. Berekeningen op de achterkant van een sigarendoos laten zien dat
de doelstellingen voor het aantal bekeuringen en zaken waarschijnlijk weinig ambitieus zijn - 
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zeker gezien de toekomstige groei in het aantal politieagenten.  De doelstellingen voor
klanttevredenheid lijken ook weinig ambitieus, omdat ze gebaseerd zijn op de eigen prestatie in
het verleden (‘presteer tenminste zo goed als in het verleden’). Als de afspraken weinig
ambitieus zijn, kunnen de korpsen hun inspanningen verlagen zodra de doelstelling is behaald.
• De prestatieafspraken conflicteren met de behoefte aan flexibiliteit op nationaal niveau. De overheid
stelt regelmatig nieuwe eisen aan de politiekorpsen. Deze veranderende beleidsprioriteiten
kunnen de gemaakte afspraken betekenisloos maken. Als de korpsen anticiperen op
veranderingen in de toekomst hebben ze weinig prikkel om nu de afspraken te behalen.
Bovendien kunnen negatieve ervaringen met prestatie-indicatoren aanleiding geven tot een
wijziging in het contract. Veranderingen in het meten en belonen van de prestatie zijn niet
ondenkbaar gegeven het gebrek aan ervaring met dit beleidsinstrument. Het tussentijds
veranderen van het contract verzwakt ook de prestatieprikkels.
• De financiële prestatiebeloning nodigt uit tot ongewenste verschuivingen in politiewerk. Het toekennen
van de prestatiebeloning vereist een ja/nee beslissing gebaseerd op het wegen van verschillende
prestatiemaatstaven. Het is echter moeilijk om een subjectieve beoordeling te vervangen door
simpele beslisregels. De overheid heeft niet de gegevens om de juiste gewichten te kiezen.
Verkeerd gekozen gewichten kunnen leiden tot ongewenste verschuivingen in politiewerk. Van
de korpsen kan immers worden verwacht dat zij zich richten op doelstellingen die met de
minste inspanning en tegen de hoogste beloning zijn te realiseren.
• De financiële prestatiebeloning conflicteert met het gebrek aan consumentenkeuze. Door het budget
van minder goed presterende korpsen niet te verhogen betalen burgers een dubbele rekening
voor slecht politiemanagement in hun regio. In tegenstelling tot scholen en ziekenhuizen
kunnen burgers niet kiezen voor een beter politiekorps anders dan door te verhuizen.
Sommige tekortkomingen zijn te verlichten...
De effectiviteit van de prestatiecontracten is te verhogen door het maken van een aantal
aanpassingen. Hiervoor zijn verschillende opties:
• Zoek naar betere prestatie-indicatoren. Betere prestatie-indicatoren kunnen de negatieve
bijwerkingen verkleinen en tegemoet komen aan de behoefte aan flexibiliteit. Van alle
maatstaven in het contract nodigen het aantal boetes en het aantal aan het Openbaar Ministerie
te leveren zaken het sterkst uit tot ongewenste gedragseffecten. Ook beperken zij de
beleidsvrijheid van de korpsen het meest. Een optie is het aantal boetes te schrappen als
prestatiemaatstaf. Ook is het mogelijk de opgehelderde zaken te wegen met de zwaarte van het
delict. Dan heeft de politie niet langer een prikkel zich op de makkelijkste zaken te richten.
• Verleg de financiële prikkels van het budget naar de beloning van managers. Op deze wijze betalen de
klanten van de politie niet langer een dubbele rekening voor matige politieprestaties in hun
regio. 
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• Verzamel betere gegevens om het ambitieniveau van de prestatieafspraken beter in te schatten.
Hiervoor zijn betere gegevens over bedrijfsprocessen nodig. Het toegankelijk maken van de rijke
bronnen van administratieve gegevens van de korpsen is hiervoor noodzakelijk.
... maar de prestatiecontracten blijven belangrijke negatieve bijwerkingen houden
Ook met deze aanpassingen blijft het gebruik van prestatiecontracten belangrijke negatieve
bijwerkingen houden. De noodzaak om te reageren op veranderende regionale en nationale
omstandigheden is moeilijk te verenigen met de wens prestaties vooraf vast te leggen. Het
inschatten van het ambitieniveau van de doelstellingen vereist een niveau van kennis over
bedrijfsprocessen en regionale omstandigheden dat niet goed is te realiseren op nationaal
niveau. Bovendien is de kwaliteit en variëteit van politiewerk gewoon niet goed te vangen in een
aantal prestatie-indicatoren. Hierdoor zal er altijd ruimte blijven bestaan voor gedragseffecten
die niet in lijn zijn met de doelstellingen van de overheid.
Naar een alternatieve benadering: het organiseren van verantwoording aan klanten en collega’s 
Gezien de tekortkomingen van de contractuele benadering is het waardevol om over de grenzen
te kijken naar alternatieve wijzen om de doelstellingen van de overheid te realiseren. Australië
en Engeland zijn twee landen die al lange tijd werken aan betere verantwoording en prikkels
voor de politie. Het is interessant te zien dat in deze landen experts nauw betrokken zijn bij de
vormgeving van het politiebeleid. Australië noch Engeland hebben gekozen voor prestatie-
contracten met financiële prikkels voor de korpsen. Zij focussen op het benchmarken van
korpsen. Vele jaren zijn geïnvesteerd in het verbeteren van de betrouwbaarheid van gegevens en
van methoden om de korpsen op een eerlijke en betekenisvolle manier te vergelijken.
Een soortgelijke benadering is uit te werken voor de Nederlandse politie. Volgens deze aanpak is
de rol van de nationale overheid niet om gewenste verbeteringen in een contract vast te leggen,
maar om verantwoording aan klanten en collega-korpsen te organiseren. Het management van
de korpsen kan worden afgerekend op basis van de uitkomsten van de evaluatie door klanten en
collega-korpsen (peer review). Klanten en collega’s zijn in de beste positie om politieprestaties te
evalueren - en om ideeën voor verbetering aan te dragen. Klanten zijn niet alleen burgers die nu
worden geënquêteerd door de Politie Monitor Bevolking, maar ook bedrijven en officieren van
justitie. Intervisie tussen korpsen is noodzakelijk voor een diepgravende en brede evaluatie van
de prestaties van een korps. De intervisie tussen korpsen dwingt het management van ieder
korps om een coherent beeld te ontwikkelen van de veiligheidssituatie in de regio, de strategie
om de problemen aan te pakken en de behaalde resultaten in vergelijking met andere korpsen.
Deze aanpak van ‘georganiseerde verantwoording’ kan bijdragen aan de ontwikkeling van een
cultuur binnen de politie die zich kenmerkt door het systematisch volgen, evalueren en
verbeteren van de prestatie. 





Of all public tasks, Dutch citizens give fighting crime and maintaining public order highest
priority (SCP, 2001). However, the performance of police services falls well short of
expectations. In no other industrialized country do citizens rate their satisfaction with the work
of the police lower than in the Netherlands (SCP, 2002, p. 666). The typical response to calls for
better policing has been an increase in police funding. The number of citizens served by each
police officer has been brought down from 390 in 1980 to 320 in 2002, a decrease of almost 20
percent. By 2010, this figure will be as low as 306, a further decrease of 4 percent (BZK and
Justitie, 2003, p. 2).
However, simply boosting general resource levels to improve safety is no longer seen as
sufficient. Public attention is slowly being refocused from the number of officers to what they
actually do and the effects of their daily work. So far little use has been made of the rich data
sources owned by the police forces (one of the exceptions is PKP, 1988). Consequently, little is
publicly known about the way police budgets have been spent or the efficiency and effectiveness
of the police. Are the regional police forces getting the most of their yearly budget of EUR 2.7
billion? What can the public expect from a further increase in the number of police officers? Are
the streets going to be safer? And if so, how do we know whether the police made the difference?
Recent claims that the efficiency of the police is declining dramatically present more questions
than answers.
1 To what extent do capacity restraints in the criminal justice system put a check on
police work? Are administrative burdens keeping the officers in the police station?
To address concerns about accountability and police performance, the Secretary of the Interior is
about to introduce performance contracts for the 25 regional police forces. Measures that
indicate the performance of the police have been identified, targets and financial incentives for
meeting those targets have been set. The regional performance contracts will be based on the
national police covenant that was signed on February 15, 2003. The performance contracts are
thought to contribute to greater accountability and a shift towards a results-oriented police
organization (BZK, 2002c, p. 72). 
2 See Schoof (2002) for an interview with Frits Vlek on the Dutch initiatives. For a critical review of British and
Australian experiences see FitzGerald et al. (2002) and Dupont (2001)
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Critical observers claim that these contracts are like a Trojan horse.
2 The publicly announced
targets and the accompanying flow of performance indicators are appealing in the sense that
they create the appearance of control over the police. However, the actual use of such contracts
could lead to various undesirable side effects. For example, a strong focus on performance
indicators could result in a bias towards objectives that can be quantified at the expense of
objectives that cannot so easily be quantified. On the basis of such arguments, sceptics claim
that the remedy is worse than the disease.
Uncertainty about the behavioural effects of performance contracts is not unique to the case of
Dutch police forces. Other sectors and countries are facing similar problems. For instance,
policy makers and analysts in the United Kingdom have spent a considerable amount of time on
improving the accountability of their police (see Drake and Simper, 2001 for an overview).
Similarly, Australia has built up a body of highly relevant literature on this topic (see Carrington
et al., 1997 for instance). Especially given the experimental stage of the Dutch system of
performance contracting, it is important that we learn from the insights and experiences that
have been built up elsewhere.
1.2 Research question
The following research question is central to this study:
Is it likely that performance contracts for the regional police forces will contribute to realization of the
Interior Department’s objectives for regional police work?
It is important to note that we focus on regional police work, not on supra-regional issues such
as fighting international crime syndicates. The latter activities are often organized at the national
or international level. We will further discuss the scope of this study in Section 1.8.
1.3 Contribution to policy making
We aim to support decision-making at the Department of the Interior by critically reviewing the
potential contribution of performance contracts. At present, the performance contracts are in
the making. They will be introduced by no later than June 30, 2003. As argued above, an
application of the insights and experiences documented in the literature to this practical
problem could help the Department appropriately implement this new policy instrument. 
3 TK 26345, Nr. 79 (2002): “During this administration the responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior for central
management of the police, as well as actual policing has been supported with wider powers. (...) The powers to
manage the regional police forces at the national level are concentrated within the Department of the Interior.”
Translated from: “In deze kabinetsperiode is de verantwoordelijkheid van de minister van BZK voor het centraal
beheer van de Nederlandse politie, alsmede voor de politiezorg nader ondersteund met bevoegdheden. Zo (...) zijn
de bevoegdheden op rijksniveau met betrekking tot het beheer van de regionale politiekorpsen bij BZK
geconcentreerd.”
4 Each force has the legal status of independent body (‘Zelfstandig Bestuursorgaan’, ZBO). A ZBO has a high
degree of autonomy in performing its public task. Other examples of ZBOs are the Social Benefit Administration
(UWV), the Central Bank (DNB) and the Department of Motor Vehicles (CBR).
5 BZK and Justitie (1998): “The differences in safety between the 25 regions (but also within these regions) make it
self evident and desirable that the forces set their own priorities (...) to achieve the objectives set at the regional
level.” Translated from: “De onderlinge verschillen in veiligheid tussen de 25 regio's (maar ook daarbinnen) maken
het vanzelfsprekend en wenselijk dat de korpsen (...)  zelf de accenten kunnen leggen voor het bereiken van
regionaal bepaalde (veiligheids-) doelstellingen.”
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Clearly, there is a particular need for input in the months to come. This study is meant to be a
timely contribution to policy making. True to the mission of the CPB Netherlands Bureau for
Economic Policy Analysis, we will clarify the choices and tradeoffs that are to be made rather
than present politically coloured answers.
1.4 The Interior Department as principal
We take the perspective of the Department of the Interior. This Department can be seen as
principal of the 25 regional police forces because of its responsibility for the efficiency and
effectiveness of the police (BZK, 2002c, p. 66 and Police Act, article 53a). Over the last years, the
role of the Department as principal at the national level has been strengthened.
3 However, the
position of the Department is different from other principals managing independent bodies.
4
Each force is embedded in a regional administrative structure that includes mayors and public
prosecutors, the respective authorities for maintaining public order and emergency assistance
and law enforcement (see the box below). Actual goals and priorities therefore tend to set at the
regional and the local level.
5 For this reason, we use a broad definition of a regional police force
that includes the force but also the regional authorities (mayors and public prosecutors). They
together are responsible for realizing the objectives of the Department within their region.
When discussing the design of performance contracts, we explicitly account for the
Department’s unique relation to the forces. 
6 So far, the principal-agent theory has not been used extensively in the area of police studies. Exception known to
the author is Prendergast (2001). In their review of the literature on the economics of law enforcement, Polinsky
and Shavell (2000, section 19) put it as line of inquiry that merits further development.
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1.5 Approach
In this study, we apply insights from the literature on the theory and practice of performance
contracts to the problem of assessing the value of such contracts for management of the regional
police forces. The analysis is qualitative of nature because of its focus on the optimal design of
an institution that is still in the making. 
Economic theory provides a useful framework for studying tradeoffs in the design of
performance contracts for police forces. The principal-agent model - developed in the economics
literature regarding incentives in organizations - provides a meaningful way of analysing the
interaction between the Department of the Interior and the police forces.
6 A substantial part of
current research on the design of performance contracts is conducted by economists or based on
economic theory.
Most of the foreign experiences documented in the literature that we review are based on
policies in the United Kingdom and Australia. Several years ago, both countries started a
comprehensive review of their police management systems. Since that time, both the United
Kingdom and Australia have worked hard to improve accountability of the police. Consequently,
they are ahead of the Netherlands when it comes to the evaluation of police performance and
Management at the regional level
At the regional level, each force is managed by the mayor of the main municipality in the region (‘korpsbeheerder’),
here forth ‘mayor in command’. He is accountable to the regional council (‘regionaal college’), which he also
presides.  The council consists of all mayors in the region and the chief public prosecutor (‘hoofdofficier van
justitie’). The regional council makes all final decisions on the budget, annual account and the regional policy plan
(‘regionaal beleidsplan’). The regional policy plan includes the objectives and priorities of the force. The mayor in
command drafts the budget, annual account and the policy plan together with the chief public prosecutor. The
(elected) local councils can advise their mayor on issues that are to be decided by the regional council. The chief
of police (‘korpschef’) assists the mayor in command with daily management of the force. He has no formal powers.
He meets the mayor in command and the chief public prosecutor on a regular basis to discuss management issues
(‘regionaal driehoeksoverleg’). There are similar regular meetings at the local level between the mayor, the public
prosecutor and local chief of police (‘locaal driehoeksoverleg’). The most striking feature of the regional institutional
structure is that all players have multiple roles. Clearly, one of the key players at the regional level is the mayor in
command. He combines many roles in one person. He is not only involved in drafting the regional police plan, but
also in accepting it as chairman of the regional council. Moreover, he supervises proper execution of the plan. 
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design of incentives for the police. There could be much to learn from experiences in these
countries.
In order to maintain a practical understanding of the issues, we conducted open interviews with
people who are involved in policy making and research in this area (see Annex 2 for a list of
consulted people).
1.6 Structure
To assess whether performance contracts for the police forces are likely to have a positive effect,
we structure the paper along the following three steps:
Step I. What goals might performance contracts serve?
As a first step, we discuss why the Department of Interior would need performance contracts.
To that end, we analyse whether the Department’s current policies - without performance
contracts - stimulate the forces to work towards their objectives. The objectives for regional
police work are defined in Chapter 2. We continue with an analysis of the forces' incentives to
realize these objectives in Chapter 3 (before the introduction of performance contracts). In
Chapter 4, we assess whether the current empirical evidence is in line with our findings in
Chapter 3. Finally, we discuss whether performance contracts are a logical policy instrument to
address the need for change in Chapter 5.
Step II. Are the proposed performance contracts likely to be effective?
After defining the goals of performance contracts, step II assesses whether the proposed
performance contracts are likely to be effective. In Chapter 6 we provide a description of what is
known at this time about the design of the proposed performance contracts. In Chapter 7 we
discuss the possible behavioural effects of these contracts. This chapter is the core of the
analysis. The conclusions of Chapter 8 provide input for the third step in the analysis: how could
the design be improved?
Step III. What is the value of performance contracts for the police?
In Chapter 9, we will provide a brief overview of the policies that are being pursued in Australia
and the United Kingdom. This look across the borders is meant to provide ideas for alternative
ways of achieving the Department’s objectives. Based on the analysis in the foregoing chapters
and the lessons from Chapter 9, we draw conclusions about the value of performance contracts
for the police forces in Chapter 10. 
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1.7 Defining the object of analysis
Here we use a descriptive definition of police services. The table below provides an overview of
the activities in which the police forces engage themselves. Later on in the report, we will discuss
the objectives that connect these activities to a common purpose. We do not include privately
provided police services in the analysis (such as private investigators, private security
surveillance, etc.). In the analysis, we take the public nature of the police as given: we do not go
into the discussion of public versus private provision (see Van der Vijver et al., 2001).
1.8 Scope
To keep the analysis tractable, we had to decide which issues are truly essential to the research
question and which issues could be left outside the scope of this study. There are four major
areas that would justify separate studies.
Interaction within the forces
We focus on the interaction between the Department of the Interior and the regional police
forces. As discussed above, there are major policy initiatives at this level - and many unanswered
questions. An analysis of incentives within the forces is beyond the scope of this study (the
interested reader is referred to Terpstra, 2002).
Table 1.1 Police tasks according to the Activities Code Table (ANP)
Task Definition
Community policing Provision of basic police services by a police unit that works exclusively in a certain
geographic working area.
Emergency assistance Providing services to people in acute emergencies on a 24/7 basis.
Criminal investigations Investigation of crimes directed at finding the offender and/or goods. This includes all
activities related to support to the public prosecutor.
Problem-oriented policing Activities that are directed at a specific item, including large events, traffic, and moral law.
Customer-oriented policing Activities at the police station related to in-person or telephone contact with the public. This
includes reporting a crime.
Special police tasks These activities are exclusively related to protection of persons/ goods, execution of penalties
and border patrol.
Note: The Activiteitencodetabel Nederlandse Politie (ANP) includes an exhaustive list of police tasks to provide a uniform framework for activity
measurement. 
7 BZK and Justitie (1998 p. 33): “... often there has been little attention to cooperation between the forces. That has
resulted in a patch work of information and management infrastructures.” Translated from: ‘... is er vaak minder
aandacht geweest voor onder meer samenwerking tussen de korpsen onderling. Dat heeft ertoe geleid dat




We focus on police work that has an exclusive regional dimension. We do not go into issues that
are beyond the control of a single police force, such as fighting organized crime (the so-called
‘bovenregionale of landelijke politiediensten’) or infrastructure issues such as shared
information and communication technology (ICT). Indeed there are major concerns in this area,
particularly about coordination between the forces (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003b concludes
that exchange of information for criminal investigations is in the same sorry state as in 1985).
Some of these concerns, such as the exchange of information between forces, directly affect
issues discussed in this report. After all, without a good facilitating role of the Department,
exchange of information within and between the forces will be hindered.
7 However, there are
different causes underlying a role for the Department in supra-regional police work (such as
externalities and coordination failure) than in the case of exclusively regional police work.
Because of the different rationale for intervention by the Department of the Interior, these issues
require a different institutional framework (nationally organized units, a centralized ICT
organization, etc.). Therefore, an analysis of the role of the Department in supra-regional police
work would require a separate study (see for example Kleemans, Brienen and Van de Bunt,
2002).
Changing the organizational framework
Some observers claim that the current organizational framework of the police does not foster a
culture of accountability and incentives to improve performance. There are many people
involved in making policy for the police, but not many of them bear responsibility for the
outcomes. Vague definitions of responsibilities may hinder accountability (Algemene
Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 18, 19). There is little democratic control of the police forces (Muller,
2002). There is no good distinction between policy making and evaluation (ibid.). The mayors in
command have the role of policy maker and auditor (see Section 1.3). The Police Inspection does
not have a strong role (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2001). The public prosecutor has only one voice
in the regional management council against many mayors. Consequently, there may be too little
attention to performance in the area of criminal investigations. Clearly, the organizational
framework of the police has effects on performance. We see the organizational framework as a
separate issue however. In this study, we take the organizational framework as given and focus
on the value of performance contracts. 
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Behavioural responses outside the economic model
The analysis is based on the economic model of behaviour assuming rational actors that
maximize their utility subject to a number of constraints. Behavioural responses that cannot be
reduced to this model are outside the scope of this study. We are convinced that the economics
literature provides a meaningful framework for studying the behavioural effects of performance
contracts. Our comparative advantage is in economics. We leave it to people specialized in other
disciplines to complement our analysis. For example, see Eisenberger and Cameron (1996) for a
highly instructive review of the effects of incentives on motivation from a psychological
perspective. 
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Step I. What goals might performance contracts serve?
Is there a need for change in the Department’s policies towards the forces? And if so, are performance
contracts likely to foresee in the need? These are the questions that we address in the first step of the
analysis. We define the objectives for regional police work in Chapter 2. Then, we go on to analyse the
forces’ incentives to realize these objectives in Chapter 3 (before the introduction of performance
contracts). In Chapter 4, we assess whether the current empirical evidence is in line with our findings in
Chapter 3. Finally, we discuss whether performance contracts are a logical policy instrument to address
the need for change in Chapter 5. 
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8 Translation from Politiewet 1993: “De politie heeft tot taak in ondergeschiktheid aan het bevoegd gezag en in
overeenstemming met de geldende rechtsregels te zorgen voor de daadwerkelijke handhaving van de rechtsorde en
het verlenen van hulp aan hen die deze behoeven.”
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2 The government’s objectives for regional police work
2.1 Aim and structure
What are the objectives for regional police work? By first defining a clear set of objectives, we
can analyse the Department’s policies aimed at realizing these objectives in later chapters. We
will argue that the desired discretion of the police forces implies a concern with the overall
performance of the forces rather than a detailed prioritization of goals for regional police work.
The forces should provide efficient, effective, fair and decent policing within the framework of
broadly defined outcomes of regional police work.
We take a number of steps before arriving at this conclusion. First, we discuss the implications
of translating the tasks of the police laid down by law into objectives in Section 2.2. Then, we
discuss the Department’s interest in providing great discretion to the regional level in Section
2.3. Clearly, the unique relation between the Department and the regional level has implications
for the way the objectives are to be defined. In Section 2.4, we discuss these implications and
provide a possible definition of the objectives. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Translating tasks into objectives
The objectives for the regional police forces are based on the task of the police described in the
Police Act of 1993, Article 2:
It is the task of the police to maintain the legal order and to provide help to those who need it - in
subordination to the proper authorities and in accordance with the rule of law.
8
More specifically, the task areas of the police are (1) maintaining public order (article 12 Police
Act 1993), (2) enforcing the law (article 12 Police Act 1993) - this task area includes enforcement
of a number of special laws including the Environmental Management Act, Immigration Law,
Licensing Act and Traffic Act - and (3) providing emergency assistance (article 2 Police Act
1993).
The general description of tasks needs to be translated into objectives. The actual wording of the
translation is essential for the range of activities the police will get involved in. By translating 
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tasks into objectives, police work is extended beyond the tasks described in the law. For example,
a burglary prevention campaign is not written into the law. In theory, the police could take up
any activity that contributes to the objectives, not only the tasks that are mentioned in the law.
Those activities include prevention work and cooperation with other actors, including the private
sector (see the box below for a simple example).
2.3 Reasons for the regional police forces’ level of discretion
The Secretary of the Interior needs to translate the tasks of the police into objectives for the
regional police forces while accounting for the unique position of the Department. After all,
many of the powers to manage the police - to set goals and priorities - are decentralized to the
regional level (see Section 1.3). As we will argue below, this specific institutional structure is in
the interest of the Department. By purposefully leaving considerable discretion to the regional
level, the Department can make use of the expertise at that level in achieving the objectives for
the police. We discuss three reasons why the forces’ experience with policing under regional
conditions is essential to effective police work.
Differing regional conditions leave room for regional priorities and methods
Crime and public order problems differ from region to region. The forces need detailed
knowledge of local circumstances to be effective. The police needs to know who is who, who
lives where, who deviates from the norm, and who had which role in what happened. They need
to build up social networks and they need to be aware of cultural patterns in the neighbourhood
(Van der Torre and Stol, 2000, Chapter 11). Clearly, the local forces have much better knowledge
of the regional conditions. Therefore, it makes sense to give the forces some freedom in setting
their own priorities and choosing their own methods.
The need to ration the supply of police services
There is structural excess demand for police services. Once taxes have been paid, the price for
additional police services is often low for individuals or groups of people. Given limited police
resources, there is an opportunity cost to reallocating resources from one activity to another
Tasks versus objectives: the case of burglary
When the police is expected to execute tasks, they would focus on criminal investigations of burglars. After all, this
is what the task ‘enforcement of the law’ included in the Police Act implies. However, when the police is expected
to achieve objectives, the exact activities are not prescribed in the law. In this case, the objective could be to lower
the rate of burglaries. It is up to the police to decide what activities best serve this objective. In practice, these turn
out to be burglary prevention campaigns rather than criminal investigations (see Van der Vijver et al., 2001, p. 39). 
9 Where individuals or groups have conflicting expectations of the police, research conducted in the United
Kingdom tends to confirm that improving satisfaction can be a ‘zero-sum game’ (FitzGerald et al., 2002, p. 113).
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activity. However, these costs are often not evenly distributed. For instance, a storekeeper would
rather see the police spending more time on reducing shoplifting than on enforcing traffic laws.
Clearly, road workers have different interests.
The forces have better information to weigh competing calls for service than the
Department. Their information advantage is based on their training and experience with police
work in their specific locality. Therefore, it makes sense to leave the forces some flexibility in
deciding whether a call is worth spending time on. This is not an easy job since the police will
always dissatisfy some people.
9 
The nature of police work defies exact task descriptions
A policy of full enforcement of criminal law would imply that the police are required and
expected to enforce all criminal statutes at all times against all offenders. It suggests that the
police are without authority to ignore violations, to warn offenders when a violation has in fact
occurred, or to do anything short of arresting the offender and placing a charge against him for
the specific crime committed. There are a number of reasons why there is room in the law to
tolerate criminal behaviour (Goldstein, 1963):
• Ambiguity of the law. Criminal law is often expressed in broad terms, which makes it difficult to
render a clear interpretation of the legislature’s intentions. Ambiguity may be intentional so as
to provide greater flexibility in enforcement. It may also result from a failure to envisage the
day-to-day problems encountered by the police or it may simply be a result of language
limitations.
• Enacting laws as a symbolic act. Some laws either cannot effectively be enforced or are not meant
to be fully enforced (think of the drug laws before they were changed). A lawmaker may enact
such laws for several reasons. Maybe she does not want to be known as someone who does not
support a law against reprehensible behaviour. Maybe she also does not want to be known as
someone who repeals a prohibition because it is not really meant to be fully enforced. She
derives her comfort from enactment of the law, not from enforcement of the law. In line with
this behaviour, new legislation declaring a form of conduct to be criminal is rarely accompanied
by an appropriation to support the resources for its enforcement. It falls to the police to live with
the law without enforcing it.
• Obsolescence of the law. The law does not get updated every time reality changes. Therefore, there
are obsolescent laws that the police cannot enforce or is not expected to enforce. 
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In theory, the Department could exactly prescribe the forces when and how to act. However, the
unpredictable nature of the demand for police services defies exact task descriptions. The police
face unexpected situations all the time. Clearly, there are patterns in criminal and disorderly
behaviour, but the precise circumstances differ every time. A police officer is trained to handle
these ever-changing situations and builds up expertise over time. Therefore, it makes sense for
the principal to leave the police some flexibility.
To conclude, it is in the interest of the Department to actively involve the forces in the process of
translating broadly defined objectives into workable goals and methods. Discretion requires the
forces to think about what they want to achieve and the most effective way of reaching that goal.
In other words, discretion comes with a responsibility for evaluation and innovation.
2.4 The dimensions of overall police performance
Given its unique relation to the regional police forces, what are the Department’s objectives for
regional police work? In this section, we will argue that the Department’s focus is on the overall
performance of the forces. The forces should provide efficient, effective, fair and decent policing
within the framework of broadly defined outcomes of regional police work.
Efficient and effective policing
Because of the great degree of discretion at the regional level, the Department of the Interior has
good reasons to define the forces’ objectives in terms of desired effects of police work (outcomes
like a change in the level of crime) rather than to provide detailed descriptions of desired outputs
(e.g. number of fines) or inputs (e.g. time spent on the streets, ‘blauw op straat’). An outcome is
meant to reflect the effect of policing on society. In practice, outcomes also reflect the effects of
many other actors and factors.
By focusing on the effects of police work, the Department relies on the forces’ expertise to:
• Choose those outputs that contribute most to the desired outcomes (maximum effectiveness). Outputs
include neighbourhood patrols, criminal investigations, prevention programs, etc. For instance,
a force may choose to focus on prevention programs rather than repressive means to fight
crime.
• Organize inputs so as to maximize output (maximum technical efficiency). For instance, a recent
effort to increase technical efficiency refers to the frequency of coffee breaks, the level of
reimbursement of travel expenses and the way the car fleet is purchased (TK 26345, 2002, p. 6).
Another example is the choice to have one officer on a beat rather than two. 
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The Department’s concern is with the outcome of these two simultaneous internal processes. In
other words: efficiency and effectiveness in terms of desired effects of police work is one of the
Department’s main concerns (see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1   Efficiency, effectiveness and the relation between inputs, outputs and outcomes
Source: Based on PSP (2000), p. 11.
Fair and decent policing
The police is bound by the imperative of providing assistance and delivering justice in a fair and
decent manner. The rules of fair and decent policing include issues such as limitations to the
powers of investigations and the use of force and non-discriminatory policing. They also include
more informal rules such as providing courtesy in all public contacts. The standards of conduct
are constraints as they tend to slow down police work. Clearly, the police cannot always be
friendly. However, even when delivering justice to hardened criminals, the forces operate under
the imperative of fair and decent policing. Without such constraints, police officers would search
houses without a search warrant, seek out criminals without reading them their rights, allowing
them to call their attorneys, or releasing them in response to a writ of habeas corpus. The
Gestapo was very efficient in maintaining public order and investigating crimes, however
defined, but its work does not appeal to our idea of fair and decent policing.
The issue is not that an efficient police force would show no positive interaction with citizens
whatsoever. To be able to do its work, it is in the interest of the police to maintain good relations
with at least some citizens. These citizens may be helpful in providing information to the police,
for example. Moreover, a highly effective police may also enjoy confidence among those who are
not confronted with police brutality. The point is that the police should work indiscriminately
with all citizens according to nationally defined standards. All citizens should get equal
treatment under similar circumstances. 
10 Terpstra (2002, p. 57): “... the focus of management has shifted from national priorities to essential conditions
for the organization.” Translated from: “... de aandacht [is] verschoven van sturing op beleidsthema’s naar sturing
op organisatorische randvoorwaarden.”
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A definition of the objectives
Based on the above discussion and the Safety Program published by the (outgoing) Balkenende
administration (Justitie and BZK, 2002), we deduce the following definition of the objectives:
The government’s objective for the regional police forces is the reduction of crime, promotion of safety
and reduction of disorder in an efficient, effective, fair and decent manner.
This definition of the objectives implies a focus on overall performance of the forces. Clearly,
when assessing performance, the desired outcomes can be made more concrete (for example the
desired contribution of the police to traffic safety and the quality of living in the neighbourhood).
The authorities at the regional level attach weights to the outcomes of regional police work; the
Department’s concern is whether regional police work meets the above-mentioned standards of
policing. After all, the forces have knowledge of regional conditions and policing unmatched at
the national level. Such a focus of the Department agrees with the status of the forces as
independent bodies with their own administrative framework of mayors and public prosecutors.
It also fits with the recent shift in the Department’s policy away from prescribing policy and




As principal of the regional police forces, the Interior Department’s objective is to make sure
that they do their work in an efficient, effective, fair and decent manner. Their performance can
be judged against outcomes deduced from the overarching objectives of the police: reducing
crime, promoting safety and reducing disorder.
In line with this definition of the objectives, the Department relies on the forces’ expertise to
choose those outputs that contribute most to the desired outcomes (maximum effectiveness)
and organize inputs so as to maximize output (maximum technical efficiency). The great degree
of discretion of the forces is based on their superior expertise in deciding (1) whether to tolerate
criminal behaviour or not, (2) how to handle criminal or disorderly behaviour, (3) how to handle
competing calls for service (4) what priorities to set and methods to use in the region. In the
next chapter, we will discuss the way in which the Department supports the forces’ efforts to
improve their performance. 
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3 Realizing the objectives
3.1 Aim and structure
How does the Department of the Interior support the police forces in their efforts to improve
their overall performance? In this chapter, we discuss the Department’s policies to realize this
objective. First, we introduce the challenge facing the Department in Section 3.2. The
Department has good reasons to provide the forces with great discretion, but is responsible for
their performance at the same time. We describe how the Department addresses this tension in
its policies towards the forces in Section 3.3. We discuss other factors affecting the forces’
motivation to work towards their objectives in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The Department’s challenge
The Interior Department may be responsible for efficient, effective, fair and decent regional
police work, the forces know ‘where policing is all about’ and ‘what is really going on in the
region’. Clearly, this is not an easy position to be in. Below, we argue that the Department will
need to rely on incentives rather than rules to realize its objectives for policing, simply because it
does not have the expertise to prescribe the forces how to organize their internal processes. By
devising well-targeted incentives, the Department can support the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of the
forces to improve their performance.
3.2.1 The rationale for providing incentives
The Department may set some rules to support improvements in performance such as
compulsory outsourcing of the car fleet, but these rules have only limited reach. The desired
discretion of the forces does not facilitate the establishment of such rules. After all, the
Department does not have the relevant information to see what works best. Is patrolling with
one officer rather than two a good idea to improve efficiency? Are prevention campaigns the best
way to lower the rate of housebreaking? Without the expertise in policing and specific regional
circumstances, the Department will have difficulty making these judgements.
If the Department is not able to prescribe how the forces should improve their performance,
then it will have to rely on incentives to ensure that the forces achieve maximum value for
money. Incentives do a call on the creativity of the forces. Given their information advantage, the
police forces are in a much better position to identify opportunities to improve their
performance (and to implement these ideas effectively). Incentives challenge the forces to find
the best way of improving performance.  As such, incentives can support the ‘intrinsic
motivation’ of the forces. 
11  The ‘quality model’ is an adapted version of the EFQM Excellence Model (as worked out by the Institute Dutch
Quality, INK). The model describes the interaction between the determinants of quality and results. Areas include
leadership, human resource management, strategy, resource management, processes, employee satisfaction,
results, customer satisfaction and citizen satisfaction. 
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3.2.2 The need to support ‘intrinsic motivation’
Clearly, police employees are not only driven by external incentives in the form of financial
rewards or career perspectives. People may choose to work for the police because of an inherent
tendency to seek out challenges, to extend and exercise their capacities, to explore, and to learn.
They are motivated to do their work well by factors that are intrinsic to them. Similarly, the
police forces can be seen as ‘intrinsically motivated’ to realize their task in their specific region.
If their motives are in line with the objectives for the forces, then the Department task of
improving police performance through ‘instrumental motivation’ can be alleviated.
Indeed there are numerous examples of initiatives to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
police work. One major initiative is the peer-evaluation that is part of ‘quality management’
(‘kwaliteitsstelsel politie’). Every four years, each force conducts a self-assessment. The
self-assessment follows the ‘quality model’ of the Dutch police.
11 The self-assessment is critically
reviewed by a team of auditors from the police and someone from outside the police. One year
later, a review committee assesses what issues have been taken up after the self-assessment and
audit. The committee consists of a mayor in command, a chief public prosecutor, a chief of
police and someone from outside the police. The findings of the committee are sent to the
Secretary of the Interior and the Police Inspection. The evaluations have resulted in some critical
remarks about the organization of the police, including a lack of focus on results and low quality
of management (FRP, 2000).
Such initiatives can be supported by recognizing and rewarding efforts to improve police
performance. There are basically two reasons for performance evaluations and accompanying
incentives:
• Feedback. Performance evaluations provide feedback to the forces on their perceived strengths
and weaknesses. For example, forces may be unaware of whether their actions are satisfactory;
an important purpose of performance evaluations is to tell the forces what areas they can
improve in (Prendergast, 2002, p. S117).
• Recognition. When the efforts that go into improving performance go unnoticed, the drive to
identify and share best practices may be weakened. In a normal market there is an automatic
reward for high performance in the form of higher returns to investment. With the monopoly 
12 The police forces may lose ‘market share’ from ‘competitors’ in the private security sector however. Indeed, the
number of employees in private security per 10 police officers has risen from 2.7 in 1990 to 4.6 in 1999 (Source:
CBS Statistical Yearbook, 2002). See Van der Vijver et al. (2001), p. 76 for a discussion of factors that drive this
trend.
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status of regional police forces there is no such reward.
12 Improving performance is a process of
trial and error that comes with high costs. It takes considerable investment in data systems,
entry of data, methods to analyse the data, and informal exchanges of experiences within and
between forces. Based on the findings painful changes may need to be made in the organization.
The accompanying costs can either be financial (e.g. investment in technologies for more
efficient scheduling) or immaterial (e.g. stress stemming from effective personnel
management). In the process, enterprising individuals within forces may have to overcome
bureaucratic barriers and a continuous, strong pressure to respond to the issues of the day.
Moreover, some benefits of the effort go to others (‘external effects’).
Therefore, incentives are instrumental in sustaining the motivation to improve police
performance. That way, the Department can provide a stimulus - necessary to signal exceptional
performance and to overcome the multiple barriers to action. Incentives do not replace but
complement intrinsic motivation. The rewards can be either financial (e.g. performance
rewards) or immaterial nature (e.g. status). As we will discuss later, it is essential that the
incentives are well targeted. Poorly designed incentives may result in ‘intrinsic frustration’
rather than support intrinsic motivation (see the box on the Policing for London study in
Chapter 5). However not providing incentives may not be appropriate response to the challenge
of designing effective incentives. Indeed, there is some evidence from psychological research
that a lack of incentives may have a negative effect on effort:
... because of systems that are insensitive to performance, some employees can vary their
performance substantially with little effect on tangible reward. A low level of performance is often
observed in such situations. Cognitive evaluation theory would explain this result as a lessening of
intrinsic interest. Alternatively, employees may learn that their performance is largely irrelevant to
reward, and such learned helplessness may have a detrimental effect on task performance. (Eisenberger
and Cameron, 1996, p. 1164).
3.3 Incentives from the Department’s policies
How does the Department address the challenge of taking responsibility for the performance of
police forces that have a great degree of discretion? The Interior Department has two policy
instruments: the distribution of budgets and the exercising of oversight. In this section, we 
13 Budgeting and oversight get more closely related in the situation that forces are under ‘special oversight’ of the
Department (‘preventief overzicht’, applied to six forces in 2000). In that case, the Secretary of the Interior needs
to agree with (changes in) the budget (In ‘t Veld et al., 2001, p. 55).
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analyse whether these policy instruments indeed support the motivation to improve
performance.
3.3.1 Distributing budgets
The distribution of budgets between the forces is dealt with separately from everything else.
There is no direct link between a force’s efforts to improve performance and budgeting
decisions. Budgeting is rule-based. Budgets are adjusted based on a funding formula (described
below). Therefore, the budget system provides no incentive to improve performance (BZK,
2001).
13
The funding formula provides the number of budget-units (‘budgetverdeeleenheden’ or BVEs)
for each police force based on a number of regional characteristics. These characteristics include
(1) miles of roads, (2) number of housing units, (3) total population, (4) number of non-Western
immigrants, (5) population density, (6) frequency of residential moves, (7) number of shops.
Frequently, the funding level for each budget-unit is adjusted. For 2003, a budget-unit is equal
to EUR 61,258. In principle, each budget-unit is equal to 0.94 FTE, but the forces have some
freedom in allocating their budgets. There are also some additional resources for forces that are
faced with a region-specific workload, for example security of the harbor (Rotterdam-Rijnmond).
3.3.2 The Policy and management cycle
The Department’s powers to oversee the performance of the regional police forces are embedded
in the Policy and management cycle (‘Beleids- en beheerscyclus politie’, described in article 43a
to 43d of the Amendment of the Police Act of October 12, 2000.). Below, we first describe the
formal process, then we discuss the way the cycle works in practice. We conclude with a
discussion of the incentives that result from the cycle.
The formal way the cycle works
 In 1998, the first cycle started with publication of the ‘Quadrennial Policy Plan’ (‘Beleidsplan
Nederlandse Politie’), produced in cooperation with the Department of Justice (BZK and Justitie,
1998). In this Plan, the Secretary and the Justice Minister stated the most important outcomes
of police work for the period 1999-2002. The outcomes included a decrease in youth crime and
street violence, better help to victims of crime, and improved traffic safety. Other outcomes
referred to supra-regional activities such as organized crime and international coordination. The
Department restricts itself to setting priorities in general terms. It is to the forces to decide 
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which outcomes should get less priority (although none of the forces gathers information about
the backlog in any of their activities on a systematic basis, see Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p.
23).
The Policy Plan provides the basis for the Annual Policy Circular (‘Landelijke Politiebrief’) that
describes the priorities of the forces for that year in more detail. The new Safety Plan includes a
new set of desired outcomes of police work for the period 2003-2006 (Justitie and BZK, 2002).
National priorities include (1) Cracking down on persistent offenders and youth criminality, (2)
Strengthening criminal investigations and law enforcement, (3) Strengthening visible control in
public space, and (4) Intensifying targeted prevention projects (Justitie and BZK, 2002).
The forces need to provide the Secretary with information that shows their efforts to realize the
desired outcomes. The Secretary can prescribe explicit rules for the way the forces collect and
provide these data. Currently, the Department prescribes the use of uniform performance
indicators included in the Information Model Police (‘Informatiemodel Nederlandse Politie’,
INP), a comprehensive effort to capture all police work in terms of results. The INP includes a
mixture of 184 outcome, output, throughput and input indicators. Since 2001, the annual report
of the police reports developments in some of the INP measures (‘Jaarverslag Nederlandse
Politie’).
There are regular meetings between the Secretary of the Interior, the Justice Minister, the
mayors in command and the chief public prosecutors to discuss progress in achieving the
prioritized outcomes stated in the Policy Plan. To ensure execution of the Policy Plan, the
Secretary of the Interior can give directions that need to be followed by the mayor in command
(‘aanwijzingen’). The mayor in command may need to change the police organization, the
budget, the annual account or the police plan in accordance with these directions. When a
force’s performance still does not meet expectations, the Secretary of the Interior can fire the
Chief of Police and (in the near future) the mayor in command (Justitie and BZK, 2002, p. 82).
The Secretary also has the authority to prescribe measures aimed at improving overall efficiency
of the forces. The Quadrennial Policy Plan includes some suggestions (BZK and Justitie, 1998,
Chapter 6 and 7). Suggested measures include a better method of scheduling work times,
mandating one-person street patrols, better processing of crime allegations and more
cooperation between forces. Another possible measure is the introduction of more flexible
working hours (ibid., p. 38). 
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How the cycle works in practice
There is a wealth of data on the way the Department’s Policy and management cycle works in
practice. Three extensive studies have been conducted in this area: In ‘t Veld et al. (2001),
Terpstra (2002) and, most recently, Algemene Rekenkamer (2003a). The conclusions of the
studies are strikingly similar. The Department’s oversight of regional police work is at best
characterized as ‘light-handed’. The collection of data needed to achieve greater accountability
creates a tremendous bureaucratic burden, but few benefit in terms of meaningful information
on performance. The forces’ operational decisions are not affected by the Department’s
oversight.
The term ‘national priorities’ suggests that the Department does not only aim at improving the
overall performance of the forces (in line with Chapter 2), but also wants to influence the relative
weights attached to outcomes of regional police work. After all, the national priorities are not
exclusively related to supra-regional police work such as fighting international crime (i.e. aimed
at influencing the allocation of resources between regional and supra-regional police work).
Moreover, the outcomes cover several but not all of the dimensions of regional police work. 
A policy of influencing priorities would go against the logic of the decentralized system of
regional police authorities in which mayors and public prosecutors are represented. Indeed,
within the forces, people see a great discrepancy between the subset of desired outcomes that are
coined ‘national priorities’ and the problems at the regional level (Terpstra, 2002, p. 52).
However, in practice, there is no (credible) prioritization of outcomes of regional police work at
the national level. Indeed, the national priorities in the Quadrennial Policy Plan were chosen so
that no conflict would result with regional priorities (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 19). But
there are many indications that there is no link between national priorities and regional
circumstances:
• The original set of national priorities was not based on any analysis of the nature, volume and
location of crime (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a., p. 12).
• There is a yearly adjustment in priorities, whereas it is hard to imagine that the safety situation
changes so quickly that the relative weight of different outcomes need to be changed on an
annual basis.
• Efforts of the forces on any of these national priorities do not lead to an adjustment in the
national priorities (Terpstra, 2002, p. 55). The list of priorities tends to expand over the years: no
priorities are dropped. The Annual Policy Circular mainly leads to an accumulation - and
therefore depreciation - of ‘national priorities’. 
14 In ‘t Veld et al. (2001), p. 93: “Most of the policy themes are put in such general and logical terms that each force
pays attention to these priorities anyway”. Translated from: “De meeste beleidsthema’s zijn dermate globaal en
logisch dat ieder korps sowieso aandacht besteed aan deze prioriteiten”.
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• The policy cycle does not even allow time for any meaningful coordination of priority setting for
regional police work (In ‘t Veld et al., 2002, p. 13). The planning cycle of the forces does not
match with the national policy cycle.
Therefore, the suggested prioritization of outcomes of regional police work at the national level
is not realized. This finding could be seen as support for a focus on overall performance of the
forces. After all, the focus of the Department is not on the relative weights attached to concrete
goals set at the regional level. Indeed, the Department is moving away from interfering with
regional policy plans towards finding a system of accountability with which to measure achieved
results. The proposed performance contracts are in line with this change in strategy.
Perhaps because of the tension felt between the suggested prioritization at the national level and
the discretion of the forces, the national priorities are not sufficiently specified to make them
verifiable.
14 Often the goals have no time horizon, no reference point, and cannot be quantified.
Moreover, some of the terms used are ambiguous (for example, what is the definition of
‘youth’?) (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 12 and 13).
Therefore, meeting the national priorities has little practical implications beyond the paperwork
that comes with it. The Department just conducts a formal check whether national priorities are
included in the regional policy plans (‘nota van bevinding’). The Department is not able to check
actual compliance with the national priorities. Despite the abundance of data, the Department is
not able to develop a clear picture of the forces’ performance. This is partly the result of the fact
that most data is incomplete and unreliable (BZK, 2001). Indeed, the paying out of the
performance rewards has been delayed with a reference to data problems (see Chapter 6).
However, a closer look at the way the Department processes these data reveals that even perfect
data would not help:
• There is no indicator of overall performance. A force may do well according to one of the 184 INP
indicators, but not so well according to another indicator, making it hard to draw conclusions.
• ‘Value for money’ is not being measured. Reporting outcomes such as a change in the ‘feelings of
safety’ across police regions is not informative for three reasons: (1) it implicitly assumes that all
forces are equally affected by the many external actors and factors that co-determine such
outcomes; (2) there is no relation with resources spent, whereas forces differ in the way they
allocate their resources to alternative goals (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 47); therefore it is 
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unclear what the forces achieve per euro or per officer; (3) it assumes that the police funding
formula is correct in distributing resources among the forces, whereas some forces may be
underfunded in comparison to other forces.
Consequently, the information collected is not used by either the Department or the forces. The
three studies into the oversight of the Department suggest that the national priorities do not
have a real effect on operational decisions of the forces.
Conclusion: lacking focus on ‘value for money’ creates little incentive
Without means to produce meaningful information on the performance of the forces, oversight
cannot provide incentives to improve performance. It is unclear whether the forces are able to
achieve the desired outcomes of regional police work in the most efficient, effective, fair and
decent manner. Consequently, the efforts of the forces to improve their performance are not
supported by the cycle. Instead, the inability to identify the results of such efforts may breed
misunderstanding or even imputation between the Department and the forces. The box below
provides some examples of the lack of meaningful interaction. The examples are based on
interviews that we conducted for this study and newspaper articles.
Some statements illustrating how the Department’s information problem may breed a mutual lack of understanding
• “We cannot achieve those results with only 4,000 additional police officers”, see ‘Handvol extra bekeuringen
de man’, NRC Handelsblad, December 31, 2002.
• “We are very busy with our own regional problems, therefore you cannot expect from us to perform well on all
the outcomes prioritized at the national level”, see in ‘t Veld et al. (2001, p. 10).
• “Our region is different from other regions; we just look inefficient.”
• “We are already changing our strategy and organization; you are too late to judge us fairly”, see Algemene
Rekenkamer (2003a, p. 42).
• “We have just started this new policy; you are too early to judge us fairly.”
• “We are limited in achieving our targets because of problems elsewhere” (such as the limited capacity of the
prosecution council and major events), see ‘Burger voelt zich onveiliger - onvrede over optreden van politie
groeit’, NRC Handelsblad, June 21, 2002.
• “We would like to follow your policy, but we are confronted with competing demands from other principals”
(such as the mayor), see Terpstra (2002, p. 77).
• ”We put quality first, we just look inefficient.”
• “Your information is outdated, we are dealing with a totally different environment now.”
• “We are professionals; we know what we are doing.” 
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3.4 Other incentives
There may also be other external incentives that affect the behaviour of the forces (see the box at
the end of this section for a story on a somewhat surprising type of financial incentive for the
police in the United States). If these incentives work in the right direction and are sufficiently
strong, they could partly offset the lack of incentives from the Department’s policies.
A source of incentives is publicity. The media spend considerable time on criminal and
disorderly behaviour and the response of the police. The status and future job perspectives of
both the mayor in command and the chief of police partly depend on the type of media coverage
they receive. Someone’s image in the media may well be an input to tenure decisions made by
principals such as the Department. Therefore, police administrators may be inclined to alter the
force’s course of behaviour if that results in good media coverage.
Lacking any better measures and information, performance of the police is mainly measured by
rough indicators such as the crime rate, the crime clear-up rate and incidents (‘police found
drugs’, ‘man bleeds to death after assault’, ‘police officer suspended after use of violence’, etc.).
Prendergast (2001) provides evidence that strong media attention to incidents of police violence
changed the behaviour of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The LAPD reduced
crime-fighting activities in an attempt to avoid further negative press and investigations. The use
of force per arrest fell, and so did the number of officer-involved shootings per officer. This
trend towards ‘cautious policing’ coincided with an increase in gang-related homicides.
Prendergast’s analysis suggests that it was in the interest of the LAPD to alter its behaviour
because of the strong media attention on incidents.
The Dutch police may be influenced by the media in a similar way. If media coverage is indeed a
strong incentive, then we may expect to see a bias towards visible output that get lots of positive
coverage (often called ‘symbolic policies’). It may explain the campaigns of preventive body
searches in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. These highly involving actions created a lot of media
attention, whereas their impact on safety and crime relative to other ways of using policy
capacity is unclear. But the anecdotal evidence on the behavioural response of the police is not
clear-cut. The widespread use of the crime clear-up rate does not appear to lead to ‘gaming’ of
the indicator by focussing on easy-to-solve crimes (for an analysis of the trends in this indicator
see Wiebrens and Essers, 1999).
To the defence of the police, media attention may also frustrate their work through sudden
changes in the goals and directions set by the regional police authorities or the Interior
Department. Ad hoc policy priorities may reflect the issues that are fashionable that week or year 
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rather than a thorough analysis of crime problems. That seems a more plausible explanation of
the frequently changing priorities than a change in the safety situation (see Section 3.3).
Incentives from media attention may explain the emphasis policymakers place on patrolling the
streets (‘blauw op straat’) at a cost of not-so-visible crime investigations (an inefficient allocation
of police resources according to some experts, see Boom, 2002). It may also explain the sudden
allocation of police resources towards airline passengers who smuggle relatively small amounts
of drugs from the Netherlands Antilles after extensive press coverage (‘bolletjesslikkers affaire’).
To conclude, another source of incentives, media attention, does not seem to stimulate efforts to
improve performance either. In the absence of better measures of performance, it may lead to
ad hoc policies. It may also lead to a bias towards visible police outputs to get positive coverage
and to over-cautiously policing to avoid negative coverage. After all, letting hard core criminals
go is likely to get less negative attention than a violent attempt to arrest them. However, we have
to be cautious before drawing hard conclusions since there is no systematic empirical evidence
on the nature of the influence of the media on police behaviour in the Dutch context.
An additional preliminary conclusion we can draw is that making a set of more consistent
performance indicators publicly available may improve the forces’ incentives to improve their
performance. We will get back to this issue in Chapter 10. 
43
3.5 Conclusions
Although the forces take initiatives to improve their performance, recognizing and rewarding
such efforts may support their motivation to do so. External incentives can provide useful
feedback on successful initiatives and compensate for the costs of improving performance.
Neither the Department’s policies nor other sources of incentives such as publicity appear to
support the forces’ intrinsic motivation, however. The lack of incentives may negatively affect
the drive to improve performance. Therefore, there seems to be a need for change in the
Department’s policies towards the forces. In the next chapter, we will discuss whether the
available empirical evidence supports this assertion.
Do financial incentives affect police behaviour? Asset seizure and forfeiture in the United States
In the United States, the federal government introduced direct financial incentives for local police agencies to ‘buy’
police time for a national priority: the ‘war on drugs’. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 allows local
law enforcement agencies to keep a portion of the net proceeds of forfeitures they help make under federal law.
These forfeitures are mainly meant to take away the proceeds of drug dealing. For example, the police frequently
confiscates cash, cars and other valuables in drug arrests. Previously, forfeited assets had been handed over to the
federal government in their entirety (the Dutch equivalent is the ‘Pluk ze’ operation).
There are indications that these direct financial incentives indeed led to a strong behavioural response of the police.
Immediately following passage of the Act, federal forfeitures increased dramatically. The amount of revenue
deposited into the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund, for example, soared from $27 million in 1985 to
$644 million in 1991 - a more than twenty-fold increase. Since 1986, the Department of Justice has distributed over
$2 billion in cash and property to local police agencies. Additional revenue comes from forfeitures done under state
law, which adds to the total intake. Some police departments single-handedly took in several million dollars for their
own use. There are concerns that the strong financial incentives lead to overzealous law enforcement harming
innocent citizens and of displacement of state and local police priorities.
Some of the growth in forfeitures may be due to a simultaneous policy change, however. Although there are strong
indications  that  the  financial  incentives  mattered,  it  is  unclear  what  their  exact  effect  is  in  relation  to  the
intensification of the ‘war on drugs’. An empirical study separating effects of the broader policy change and the
financial incentives would be necessary to turn the above indications into hard evidence.
Sources: Dunn (2000), Skolnik (2001). 
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4 Empirical evidence on police performance
4.1 Aim and structure
In Chapter 3, we concluded that there seems to be a lack of incentives to support performance
improvements. If the lack of incentives makes a difference, we should be able to notice that
police performance stays behind. In this chapter, we will review some of the empirical evidence.
As we will see, empirical analyses into the performance of the forces are scarce. The lack of
evidence itself indicates that improving police performance has not been high on the agenda.
4.2 Hypotheses
We will assess whether the following hypothesis can be supported:
Hypothesis 1. The regional police forces are operating at lower than maximum performance
compared to foreign police operating under similar conditions.
Hypothesis 2. There are great differences in performance between individual forces.
Hypothesis 3. The forces do not show much improvement in their performance.
As a clarification of the second hypothesis: lacking effective oversight from above, there is no
strong incentive to exchange best practices among the forces. In other words, the regional forces
operate as ‘islands’ when it comes to learning how to improve performance. If this is the case,
we expect to see great differences in performance between forces.
4.3 Crime clear-up rate Nordrhein-Westfalen vs. the Netherlands
Tak and Fiselier (2002) compared the crime clear-up rate between the German state of
Nordrhein-Westfalen and the Netherlands. Their findings can help us to test the first hypothesis:
are foreign police performing better than Dutch police?
Nordrhein-Westfalen is comparable to the Netherlands on many dimensions, including
economic, demographic and social variables that explain crime (ibid., Chapter 1). The two
regions have a similar level of recorded crime. Therefore, it is interesting to compare police
performance between both regions. A comparison learns that the Dutch police performance
seems to be much lower than that of the police of Nordrhein-Westfalen. In 1999, the German
crime clear-up rate was 50.1 percent, whereas the Dutch rate was 13.4 percent (ibid., p. 26).
Whereas the German clear-up rate has been increasing over the last 20 years, the Dutch clear-up
rate has been on the decrease over the same period. 
15 There can be two reasons why German crimes are easier to solve than Dutch crimes: (a) compared to the
German police the Dutch police may focus on hard-to-solve crimes.; (b) a difference in the ‘supply’ of crimes:
either reporting behaviour differs (Germans report more easy-to-solve crimes) or there is a difference in the
underlying supply of crimes (there are more easy-to-solve crimes in Germany).
16 Based on these data, we cannot directly test the claim that stronger incentives will result in higher efficiency.
After all, Tak and Fiselier (2002) do not provide us with an analysis of the incentive structure within the police of
Nordrhein-Westfalen.
17 Not all penalties take the form of incarceration. Other penalties include fines and duties. With the help of
guidelines of the prosecution council each penalty can be converted into an equivalent number of prison days.
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However, there are several possible alternative hypotheses that have to be tested before we can
draw hard conclusions. First, there could be a difference in counting the number of solved
crimes. The authors claim that such differences do not drive the results: the German and Dutch
police use a similar definition of a cleared crime  (ibid., p. 38). A second hypothesis is that
German crimes are for some reason easier to solve than Dutch crimes.
15 This hypothesis can be
easily refuted: Dutch clear-up rates are consistently lower than German rates across many types
of crimes (ibid., Table 5, p. 27). Third, it could be that the German police allocates many more
resources to criminal investigations than the Dutch police (the number of officers per
population is equal in both regions). We know that the Dutch police spends some 5 percent of
their time on criminal investigations (OM, 2002). However, we do not know how the German
police compares to the Dutch police in terms of allocation of time. We do know that research has
shown that the amount of time spent on criminal investigations tends to be relatively low in
many countries (Van der Vijver et al., 2001, p. 50). However, lacking exact data, we cannot
explicitly test the hypothesis that the regional police forces are operating at lower than maximum
performance compared to foreign police operating under similar conditions.
To conclude, a comparison of crime clear-up rates indicates that the Dutch police forces are
relatively inefficient crime solvers compared to the police in the German state of
Nordrhein-Westfalen. Somehow, the German police is able to produce more output than the
Dutch police with a comparable budget and within a similar operating environment.
16 As stated,
the difference in performance could be (partly) due to differences in time spent on criminal
investigations.
4.4 Weighted solved crimes per officer across forces
As an alternative to the crime clear-up rate, Wiebrens (2002b) presents the ‘weighted solved
crimes per officer’. He weighs each crime that a force forwards to the prosecution council with
the corresponding penalty in terms of prison days,
17 adds up these ‘prison day equivalents’ and
divides the resulting total by the number of police officers. The average penalty for a crime is a 
18 We assume that there are equal returns (in terms of prison day equivalents) to investigative efforts for different
crimes. Under this assumption, it does not matter whether a force focuses on crimes that are relatively easy to
solve. This force will solve more crimes, but each crime gets a lower weight, making the total prison day
equivalents per officer comparable to a force that focuses on hard-to-solve crimes.
19 The absence of major differences in time spent on criminal investigations also refutes the idea that
imperfections in the funding formula drives the apparent differences in performance. After all, the approximately
equal share of resources allocated to investigations puts the forces on an equal footing.
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measure of the severity of a crime. Wiebrens’s measure provides an indication of a force’s
efficiency in investigating crimes. His findings can help us to test the second and third
hypothesis: are there great differences in performance between forces? and: do the forces show
much improvement in their performance?
Data over 2001 show wide differences in performance between the forces. On average, officers
in Noord Holland-Noord each produced 206 prison day equivalents compared to 315 days per
officer in Flevoland.
18 Not all of the difference may be attributable to efficiency however. First,
large forces may enjoy scale economies in crime investigations compared to small forces.
Wiebrens claims that the data does not support this hypothesis (ibid., p. 902). Second, some
forces may spend more time on crime investigations than other forces. The  Algemene
Rekenkamer (2003a, p. 47) provides data on allocation of time by four forces in different parts of
the country over 2001. Based on these data, we conclude that there are no major differences
between forces in time spent on crime investigations. Therefore, the differences in performance
do not seem to be the result of different allocations of police time.
19
A comparison of the performance over the period 1996-2001 gives a bleak picture of the
development of efficiency of the forces. Over this period, the police budget grew by 17 percent.
However, the number of prison day equivalents per officer decreased by 12 percent. The
decrease cannot be explained by lighter penalties: the average penalties for crimes remained
constant over this period. There are widely differing developments in efficiency between forces.
One force improved its performance (Groningen), three forces remained constant
(Amsterdam-Amstelland, Brabant-Noord and Gelderland-Zuid), the other 21 forces’
performance worsened - with some forces showing a decrease of more than 25 percent
(IJsselland, Gelderland-Midden and Noord Holland-Noord). It is unlikely that the forces differed
greatly in changes in allocation of time to tasks producing ‘prison day equivalents’, making it
more likely that there are wide differences in efficiency between forces.
To conclude, Wiebrens’s analysis provides indications that the efficiency of most forces in crime
investigations decreased substantially over the period 1996-2001. Some of the decrease may be
due to changes in the allocation of time away from criminal investigations. A firmer conclusion 
20 We asked the authors to exclude the ‘Wet Mulder’ in their computations as the somewhat outdated weights used
to derive the volume of output were made before the introduction of speed and red light cameras. The current
weights are based on PKP (1988) and will be updated in the near future.
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is that there are wide differences in (changes in) efficiency between the forces.  Moreover, some
poorly performing forces were not able to catch up with other forces.
4.5 Overall productivity of the police, 1980-2000
Kuhry and Van der Torre (2001) are unique in deriving a measure for changes in overall
productivity of the police. Productivity is defined as the efficiency in producing outputs (e.g.
clearing up a crime). This measure matches with the concept of technical efficiency (see Chapter
2). It is measured as ‘total factor productivity’: the change in output that cannot be attributed to
growth in labour (i.e. change in the total number of worked hours) or a rise in the amount of
capital per unit of labour (e.g. a higher number of police cars per officer). Their findings can
help us to test the third hypothesis: do the forces show improvement in their performance?
The authors derive the productivity measure in four steps. First, they develop an index for
changes in the volume of output over time. Police products are multiplied with weights that
reflect their relative use of police time. The size of the population is used as a proxy for those
activities that do not produce easily measurable outputs (community policing, emergency
assistance and some prevention activities). Second, the output index is multiplied with costs per
unit of output (deflated with a general price index) to derive changes in the real costs per unit of
output. Third, the resulting change in real costs per unit of output are decomposed in three
parts: (a) change in real labour costs per FTE (b) change in real non-labour costs per unit of
output, and (c) change in labour productivity. Finally, the difference between the changes in
labour productivity and in non-labour resources per unit of output weighted with their
respective costs shares gives us the rate of technical change, i.e. the change in ‘total factor
productivity’.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the growth in labour and output and the change in labour productivity,
technical change over the last 20 years. The figures exclude the effect of the introduction of
automated detection and processing of traffic offences (‘Wet Mulder’) on productivity.
20 Clearly,
labour productivity has gone down since about 1990. Somehow, the growth in the number of
officers did not translate in a similar growth in the volume of output. The decrease in labour
productivity was cushioned by capital deepening investments (the change in labour productivity
exceeds technical change in Figure 4.2). Apparently, police work was positively affected by a
higher amount of capital per unit of labour (such as police cars and information systems). 
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Figure 4.1   Changes in volume of output and labour, Dutch police, 1980-2000 (1990=100)
Figure 4.2   Labour productivity, technical change, Dutch police, 1980-2000 (1990=100)
Source: Based on Kuhry and Van der Torre (2001). 
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Again, the empirical evidence points at worsening police performance. The rate at which
performance is decreasing is improbably high, however. According to this analysis, labour
productivity has decreased by more than 15 percent over the period 1990-2000. What is going
on here? Clearly, changes in the level of effort cannot fully explain this dramatic change. In the
next section, we will discuss a number of policies that could have contributed to the decline in
measured performance. Additionally, there may be some technical reasons for a downward bias
in the productivity measures. First, improvements in the quality of (measured) output may not
have been accounted for. Second, efficiency improvements may have been excluded because of
the use of outdated weights underlying the index for the volume of output. For example, the
introduction of computers may have made administrative police work more efficient.
4.6 Possible explanations for the decline in efficiency
All three studies provide indications that the efficiency of the police has been decreasing. Dutch
crime clear-up rates have been declining over the last 20 years, whereas they have been stable or
improving in other countries. The number of weighted solved crimes per officer has decreased
over the last five years. Similarly, total factor productivity of the police has been on the decrease
since 1990.
A priori, there is no clear explanation for the decline in efficiency. Given a lack of incentives,
performance could stay behind, but performance should not necessarily decline - certainly not at
this rate. Based on interviews, we found a number of possible explanations for the decline in
efficiency:
• Restraint on police output by the prosecution council. Over the last five to six years, the prosecution
council has been actively limiting the number of charges forwarded to the prosecutor because of
a lack of capacity (for the specifics of this policy see the front page of de Volkskrant, September
27, 2002). An indication supporting this hypothesis is the decrease in the number of
(non-technical) dismissed charges (from 23,366 in 1995 to 11,373 in 1999, see Huls et al., 2001,
p. 339). After all, a decrease in the excess supply of charges would lead to a lower number of
dismissals.
• Greater administrative burden. The administrative burden related to handling crime are said to
have increased with greater attention to care for victims of crime (including ‘Wet en Richtlijn
Terwee’ introduced in 1995) and to rules for criminal investigations (including ‘Wet Bijzondere
Opsporingsbevoegdheden’, BOB, introduced in 2000).
• Greater attention to labour-intensive fighting of organized crime. Especially during the period that
Hirsch Ballin was Minister of Justice (1989-1994) more attention was given to fighting
organized crime. Resources were shifted from regional police work to the supra-regional and 
21 Zoomer (2001, p. 23) describes the tasks of a community beat officer as follows: ‘[next to traditional police tasks,
the officer spends time on] conferring with external partners (including the local administration, assistance, people
in the neighborhood, proprietors and others), building and maintaining networks and stimulating the self-reliance
capacity of citizens’. Clearly, none of these activities create much measurable output.
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national level. Often a single case involved many detectives. Consequently, output per officer
declined.
• Shift to community policing. Another explanation for the decline in efficiency is a shift to activities
with lower measurability of outputs such as community policing (‘blauw op straat’). The above
evidence is biassed towards efficiency in the area of criminal investigations for reasons of
measurability of output.
21 Increased coordination with other parties in the neighbourhood such
as youth work became more time consuming. Combined with a policy of highly tolerant policing
on the street (‘gedogen’), a policy officer shifted to this area will not produce much measurable
output. This trend may have been strengthened by the shift from active work to back office
functions resulting from the reorganization of 1993/94 (Rovers, 1999, p. 14).
Lacking further empirical evidence, we do not know which explanation is valid. If we would be
able to directly test these hypotheses, then the key question would be whether these
developments are desirable. If the administrative burdens indeed serve a purpose and more
officers were shifted to community policing, how did that work out in terms of (feelings of)
safety, for example? What happened to the effectivity of police work? Unfortunately, there are
very few studies available on the effectiveness of police work. To the best of our knowledge, there
is no study that looks into value for money in terms of effects of police work on society. This is
not surprising given the difficulties related to measuring the effects of police work, even on
things as crime (see McCrary, 2002 and Travis and Waul, 2002). Clearly, there is a need for
empirical studies into the effects of police work rather than efficiency of a small set of tasks that
produce easily measurable outputs.
4.7 Conclusions
Based on the scarce empirical evidence on police performance, we can draw the following
conclusions:
• There are strong indications of great differences in (changes in) efficiency between forces. Moreover,
some poorly performing forces are staying behind: they are not able to catch up with the other
forces.
• Either the Dutch police are working highly inefficient and are increasingly becoming more so - also
compared to foreign police working under similar conditions - or efficiency just seems to be going down
as a result of (a) capacity problems in the criminal justice system; (b) greater administrative burdens; 
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(c) greater attention to labour-intensive fighting of organized crime; and (d) a shift to activities with
lower measurability of output such as community policing.
The first conclusion supports the idea that lacking effective oversight from above, the forces
have little incentive to share best practices. Apparently, the forces operate as ‘islands’ rather than
‘partners in crime’ who share best practices. Lacking better information on the factors driving
the ‘productivity puzzle’, we cannot be more specific in our conclusion about overall efficiency.
Clearly, more empirical research in this area is needed. As we stated at the beginning of the
chapter, the lack of empirical studies into police performance indicates that improving police
performance has not been high on the agenda.
In Chapter 5, we will discuss how performance contracts between the Department and the forces
could strengthen incentives aimed at improving performance. 
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5 The rationale for performance contracts
5.1 Aim and structure
The findings in Chapter 3 and 4 support the government’s wish to improve accountability and
incentives for the police. Although the empirical evidence is scarce, it all points at poor and
decreasing police performance and great differences in performance between forces. Given the
apparent need for change, is it logical to use performance contracts as an instrument to achieve
the Department’s objectives for the forces? In this chapter, we define conditions under which
performance contracts could indeed be effective.  We also review some of the scarce empirical
evidence on the potential of performance contracts in the case of policing. Before launching into
the discussion, we start with a definition of performance contracts.
5.2 What is a performance contract?
Performance contracts can be defined as follows:
In a performance contract, the principal specifies rewards and possibly penalties conditional on the
extent to which the contracting organization meets targets on specific performance indicators.
It is important to note that the performance contracts are aimed at the organizational level.  As
such, they are different from contracts between the principal and contracting managers, so
called ‘managerial contracts’.
Despite their suggestive name, public sector performance contracts are rarely legally binding. In
most cases performance contracting is implemented by administrative and managerial
discretion rather than under a statutory or legal basis. They are mutually negotiated, or even
implied, agreements between agencies to clarify undertakings of mutual interest (OECD, 1999,
p. 14).
Examples of performance contracts
There are a number of performance contracts in place within the Dutch public sector. One of
the most talked-about examples is the contract between Netherlands Railways (Nederlandse
Spoorwegen, NS) and the Department of Transportation. The NS provides railway passenger
services throughout the Netherlands. The contract was initiated in 2000. It included penalties
for not meeting targets for frequency of services and punctuality. Indeed, the NS has been fined
when targets were not met. In the latest version of the contract, these financial incentives have 
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been dropped, however (‘Derde Verlengingovereenkomst bij het verlengde Overgangscontract
II’).
A second example - that excludes rewards or penalties - is the contract between the Informatie
Beheer Groep (IBG) and the Department of Education. The parties entered into the first contract
in 2002. The IBG is tasked with administering student loans and grants and the public
transport student pass (‘OV-studentenkaart’), providing information to students and a number
of other, related activities. Performance targets are related to response time to phone calls and to
objections in writing, customer satisfaction and the number of objections lodged by customers.
The two above examples are closest to the definition at the beginning of this section. There are
several other, more implicit performance contracts for independent bodies and other relatively
independently operating government agencies. ‘Watered down’ versions of performance
contracts can be found in social security (e.g. between the Social Benefit Administration(UWV)
and the Department of Labour, see Koning and Delen, 2003) and in the area of publicly funded
research (e.g. between the institute for applied research TNO and the government, see Cornet
and Van de Ven, 2003). Recently, there has been calls for the application of performance
contracts in many other areas including the prosecution council, the provinces and
municipalities.
5.3 Conditions for effective performance contracts
Performance contracts fit in with the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of the forces to improve their
performance themselves and acknowledge the information asymmetry between the Department
and the forces on the way to improve performance. Performance contracts combine the two
policy instruments of the Department - distributing budgets and exercising oversight of the
performance of the forces.
However, there are a number of non-trivial conditions that need to be met to turn performance
contracts into an effective policy instrument: commitment of the Department and conditions for
contract design. As we will discuss below, these conditions pose major challenges to the
Department. If performance contracts can indeed be made effective, then their benefits need to
be weighed against the transaction costs related to negotiating agreements and monitoring
compliance. 
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Department’s commitment to terms of contract and non-intervention
Commitment of the Department to the terms of contract and to a policy of non-intervention is
necessary to create incentives:
• Commitment to the terms of contract. If the Department changes the terms of contract frequently,
then the forces may start to anticipate on these changes. When the Department loses its
reputation as trustworthy contracting partner, the performance contracts are not likely to
strengthen incentives. Therefore, the Department has an interest in committing to the terms of
contract, i.e. the way performance is measured and rewarded.
• Commitment to non-intervention. Withholding from intervening in the internal optimization
processes of the forces during the contract period strengthens incentives. After all, the whole
idea of the performance contracts is that the Department leaves the forces sufficient room for
their own optimization processes. By following a policy of non-intervention the Department
does not become a ‘co-producer’ who shares responsibility for the results. Thus the credibility of
the Department as contracting party - and therefore the power of incentives for the forces -
depends on the commitment to non-intervention.
The wish for flexibility in steering the police and adapting the terms of contract may go against
the desire for commitment. A policy of non-intervention conflicts with the current habit of
authorities to place sudden, new demands on the police - for example in response to media
reports (see Section 3.4). As argued in Chapter 2, it is actually in the interest of the Department
not to intervene in internal processes of the forces (except from rules for fair and decent
policing). In principle, the Department’s objective for the forces should provide for a stable set
of benchmarks to be included in the performance contracts. However, it is unclear whether
there is political will to commit to non-intervention.
Additionally, the Department may be tempted to change the terms of contract when there are
bad experiences with the original contract design. Given the current state of thought on this
topic in the Netherlands, it is imaginable that new performance indicators will be developed that
better reflect the results of regional police work. By ‘freezing’ current methods in a performance
contract, the Department will not be able to make use of these advances. Therefore the
Department is faced with a tradeoff between commitment and flexibility. Committing to the
terms of contract has the advantage of strengthening incentives, but goes at a cost of the
flexibility to make use of future advances in measuring and rewarding police performance.
Contract design results in well-targeted incentives
Additionally, there are a number of conditions for contract design that need to be met if
performance contracts are to be effective: 
22 Assuming that substitution between tasks is possible; if tasks are complementary, an incomplete contract will
not create a bias in police work, see Section 7.3.1.
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(1) Performance assessment should strengthen incentives without inviting the forces to ‘game’ the
evaluation:
• The performance measures should pick up the results of effort in all of the relevant
dimensions of police work so as to prevent biases in policing.
22
• Manipulation of data should not substitute for real efforts to achieve the performance targets
(manipulation is not inconceivable given the recent fraud in higher education and
employment placement services).
• The forces should have control over the performance indicators. There is no incentive
without a link between effort and measured performance.
(2) Measurement error should not weaken incentives by distorting the link between effort and
performance.
(3) Targets and rewards should strengthen incentives without creating undesirable side effects:
• Unrealistic targets should not undermine incentives.
• Bringing together several performance measures to determine whether to award the
financial reward or not should not invite the forces to game the assessment (by only focusing
on the easy targets, for example).
• Strong financial incentives do not put poor performers into a negative spiral. With strong
budgetary consequences of poor police performance, citizens would pay twice for poor
management within the police. After all, citizens do not have a choice among different police
departments.
The importance of contract design is underlined by empirical research into this topic. In a
review of almost 100 psychological studies into the effects of reward on motivation, Eisenberger
and Cameron (1996) find that ‘detrimental effects of reward occur under highly restricted, easily
avoidable conditions’. Similarly,  in an empirical study on the effects of performance contracts
on productivity in Chinese state enterprises, Shirley and Xu (2001) find that the design of
performance contracts makes all the difference. Successful performance contracts can improve
productivity when they provide high-powered incentives, use sensible  targets and signal
commitment through features as long terms. Favourable environmental conditions can further
strengthen thoughtful design of incentives. The more effective performance contracts are more
likely in smaller, relatively well-running, competitive firms. In the absence of these features,
performance contracts can hurt productivity. Thus, contract design can make or break
performance contracts. 
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A priori, it is hard to unambiguously answer the question whether the conditions for effective
contract design can be met in the case of policing. We will have to rely on evidence in other
countries. We review some of the existing evidence in the next section.
The transaction costs of performance contracts
Performance contracts are not costless (neither are other management regimes). If performance
contracts can indeed be made effective, then the marginal benefits need to be weighed against
the additional costs. The costs of performance contracts include time and other resources spent
on negotiating various agreements and monitoring compliance, preparing periodic reports and
statements, and maintaining contracting and monitoring staffs. In a study of performance
contracts in New Zealand, Schick (1996, p. 24, 25) finds that a non-trivial part of the efficiency
gains resulting from performance contracts may have been absorbed by high transaction costs
associated with negotiating agreements and monitoring compliance.
5.4 Empirical evidence on the potential of performance contracts for policing
To the best of our knowledge, performance contracts for the police - including rewards and/or
penalties - have not been applied anywhere around the world. Therefore, there is no direct
empirical evidence on the effects of performance contracts in the area of policing.
The only study providing empirical evidence on the behavioural response to incentives we are
aware of is the ‘Policing for London’ study (FitzGerald et al., 2002). This study is based on focus
groups and in depth interviews with a large number of London police officers and managers.
The study provides some interesting clues as to how well the ‘contracts’ worked for them. We
provide a summary of the findings in the box below. The response from the London police
shows that the performance measures could not simply be ignored. The contract introduced
incentives to align behaviour with the performance measures. The authors do not provide
information on any unexpected behavioural responses to the measures. They focus on the
perception of the measures by the police instead. Most important conclusion is that
performance measures result in frustration if they do not match with the locally perceived ideas
about the priorities in police work. 
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5.5 Conclusions
In theory, performance contracts could leverage the Department’s oversight of the forces’
performance by tying budgetary consequences to improvements in efficient, effective, fair and
decent policing. They fit in with the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of the forces to improve their
performance themselves and acknowledge the information asymmetry between the Department
and the forces  on the way to improve performance. The resulting incentives can complement
the ‘intrinsic motivation’ of the forces by providing feedback and compensating for the many
Policing for London: behavioural response to performance targets with implicit rewards and penalties
Police officers and managers working with the Metropolitan Police in London were interviewed to see how they
appreciated the use of quantitative performance measures. In 1999-2000, they had to comply with 9 Key Objectives
set by the Home Secretary, 9 Metropolitan Police Charter Targets, 38 Best Value Performance Indicators from the
Audit Commission, and 29 performance indicators used by the Police Inspection (HMIC). The interviewees pointed
out that the focus on these performance indicators was no unqualified success. The measures forced the police into
a crime fighting strait jacket and led to conflicts between national demands and local needs. These undesirable
side-effects resulted in a loss of staff morale.
Implicit bias towards crime fighting
The performance measures generally gave primacy to crime-fighting objectives at the expense of order maintenance.
Managers felt that the measures implicitly assumed a purpose of policing that did not match with their own
experiences. There was a lot of pressure to meet targets on a narrow range of crimes, which only represented a
minority of the calls they had to answer.
Tension between national demands and local needs
The performance measures imposed the same priorities across widely differing areas, regardless of variations in
crime problems. This limited the capacity of local police to prioritize according to local need. Middle managers
found themselves squeezed between centrally set priorities, on the one hand, and local needs and locally expressed
priorities on the other. They felt the performance measures by which the central government judged them were not
the criteria by which the public judged them.
Loss of staff morale
The crime-reduction targets which local managers had to deliver did not match with the workforce’s understanding
of what the job was actually about. Furthermore, the targets had little link with reality. They had been arbitrarily set
in the absence of any firm knowledge about the means by which they could be achieved. The mismatch between
centrally set performance targets and the workforce’s sense of purpose - combined with the administrative burden
related to reporting achievements - compounded the cynicism about management, and resulted in a loss of staff
morale.
Source: FitzGerald et al. (2002). 
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barriers that need to be overcome to improve performance. As such, performance contracts
could foresee in the apparent lack of incentives for the forces.
The potential beneficial effect of performance contracts on police performance is conditional on
the Department’s commitment to the terms of contract and a policy of non-intervention and on
the possibility of creating well-targeted incentives with the use of performance measures, targets
and rewards.
The wish for flexibility in steering the police and adapting the terms of contract may undermine
the power of incentives. A policy of non-intervention conflicts with the current habit of
authorities to place sudden, new demands on the police - for example in response to media
reports. Additionally, the Department may be tempted to change the terms of contract when
there are bad experiences with the original contract design.
Designing a contract in a way that results in well-targeted incentives for the police may be even
more challenging. There are many ways in which well-intended efforts to strengthen incentives
could have undesirable side effects. Little is known about the behavioural effects of performance
measures, targets and rewards in the area of policing, however. The current empirical evidence
provides little guidance. Experiences in London show that a mismatch between performance
measures and locally perceived priorities in police work may frustrate rather than support
intrinsic motivation. 
Moreover, the uncertain benefits of performance contracts will need to be weighed against the
possible increase in transaction costs. Experiences in New Zealand show that high transaction
costs are associated with negotiating agreements and monitoring compliance. 
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Step II. Are the proposed performance contracts likely to be effective?
In step I, we concluded that, in theory, performance contracts could be instrumental in achieving the
Department’s objectives for the forces - conditional on contract design, commitment of the Department,
and transaction costs. We now focus on effective contract design. Are the proposed performance
contracts likely to introduce well-targeted incentives?
In Chapter 6, we provide a description of what is known at this time about the design of the proposed
performance contracts. In Chapter 7, we discuss the difficulties of evaluating police performance. In
Chapter 8, we assess the likelihood that the performance contracts will be effective. The conclusions of
the second step provide input for the third step in the analysis: what is the value of performance
contracts for the police? 
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23 Translated from Justitie and BZK (2002): “Met betrekking tot de objectieve veiligheid is in het programma
aangegeven dat een vermindering van de criminaliteit en overlast in de publieke ruimte met - indicatief - circa 20
tot 25% vanaf 2006 in het vizier moet komen.”
24 The mayors were little enthusiastic when signing the covenant (de Volkskrant, February 15, 2003). “We should
not pretend that the Netherlands is going to be safer with this kind of documents”, according to mayor Weterings
of Beverwijk. Brouwer, mayor of Utrecht, signed the covenant since, and we quote, “I cannot explain not signing.
After all I go for more safety.”
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6 The proposed performance contracts
6.1 Aim and structure
In this chapter, we describe the proposed performance contracts between the Department of the
Interior and the regional police forces. Section 6.2 provides a brief history of the current
proposals and the plans for the near future. We discuss the design of the performance contracts
in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 concludes.
6.2 Brief history and plans for the future
The performance contracts are meant to improve accountability and to create incentives at the
regional level for the realization of the 2003 national police covenant. The covenant is meant to
support the objectives set out in the ‘Safety Plan’ (‘Veiligheidsprogramma’) of the (outgoing)
Balkenende administration. The overall aim of the Safety Plan is that ‘there is indication that a
decrease in crime and disorderly behaviour of about 20 to 25 percent is in sight by 2006’.
23 The
covenant was signed on February 15, 2003 by the Secretary of the Interior, the Justice Minister
and the mayors who are in command of the regional police forces (‘korpsbeheerders’).
24 The
parties agreed to enter into regional performance contracts by no later than July 1, 2003. The
performance contracts may actually also include goals that go beyond the national covenant.
The main precursor of the performance contracts is the system of performance rewards that
never got off the ground. In the national police covenant 1999, the Secretary of the Interior and
the management council of the police (‘Korpsbeheerdersberaad’) agreed to introduce
performance rewards by no later than 2001. In December 2000, the Secretary of the Interior
asked the management council to advice on the design of performance rewards. In expectation
of the advice, the Secretary stated that performance rewards would indeed be introduced in 2001
(BZK, 2001). The council presented its advice to the Secretary in June 2001 (KBB, 2001). Some
two months later, the Secretary sends out a letter to the Parliament saying that he will adopt the
proposed system (TK 26345). The first round of performance rewards would be paid in 2002.
However, in November 2002, the Parliament was informed that payments of the performance 
25 BZK (2002d): “Despite all efforts of the forces and the audit that I conducted, I have to acknowledge the fact that
we have not succeeded in achieving a level of data quality that allows legitimate payments. The latter point, the
legitimacy, makes paying out the relative performance reward impossible. Therefore, I have decided to pass
payments for another year.” Translated from: “Ondanks alle inspanningen van de korpsen en de door mij
uitgevoerde audit, heb ik moeten constateren, dat het nog niet goed gelukt is de kwaliteit van de gegevens op een
zodanig peil te brengen dat een rechtmatige betaling mogelijk is. Dit laatste punt, de rechtmatigheid, maakt de
uitbetaling van de benchmark component onmogelijk. Derhalve heb ik besloten ook dit jaar niet tot uitbetaling over
te gaan”.
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reward were put off to 2003 (BZK, 2002d). The Secretary said that incomparability of data did
not allow for legitimate payments.
25 In the beginning of 2003, the Secretary of the Interior and
the Justice Minister announced that the system of performance rewards should be changed
given the new national police covenant (BZK and Justitie, 2003). The performance rewards will
be integrated with the new performance contracts, which are to be signed before July, 2003.
Until that time, the conditions for receiving the performance rewards are unclear.
6.3 The design of the performance contracts
The performance measures and targets in the performance contracts will reflect agreements
made in the national police covenant (BZK and Justitie, 2003). The financial incentives for the
forces will be largely based on the existing system of performance rewards (ibid., Article 4).
Performance measures and targets
The performance measures in the national police covenant include output measures (fines,
charges), subjective performance measures (customer and citizen satisfaction with police work),
and measures of internal performance (timeliness, efficiency, sickness absence, quality of
telephone service). Based on these measures, targets will be set for each of the regional forces.
Table 6.1 provides an overview of the measures and goals included in the covenant (BZK en
Justitie, 2003).
The financial rewards
The annual budget earmarked for performance rewards is EUR 52 million (BZK, 2002d). This is
equal to 2 percent of the total police budget; 98 percent of the budget will still be allocated based
on exogenous factors such as miles of roads in the region. Of the total performance budget, 75
percent is used for rewarding superior individual performance of a force (the ‘individual
component’) and 25 percent for rewarding superior relative performance (the ‘benchmarking
component’). Each force will receive a reward equal to 1.5 percent of its budget if it meets the
performance targets for the period 2003-2006. The reward will most likely be allocated on an
annual basis. Additionally, there is a (relatively small) reward for performing better than other 
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forces of 0.5 percent of the police budget. These relative performance rewards make up only 25
percent of the total budgets for rewards. At the time of our writing, it is unclear how the
benchmarking contest will be designed.
6.4 Conclusions
The performance contracts are meant to improve the forces’ accountability and incentives in
light of the agreements included in the new ‘National Police Covenant’. Each force will receive a
modest financial reward if it meets the performance targets. The contract includes output
measures (fines, charges), subjective performance measures (customer and citizen satisfaction),
and measures of internal performance (timeliness, efficiency, sickness absence, quality of
telephone services). Other measures may be included. Additionally, there is a (relatively small)
Table 6.1 Performance measures and goals for 2006 in the national police covenant
Performance measure Goal
Output measures
Number of fines and transactions 180,000 additional fines and transactions after police stops per year  - an
increase of 15 percent
Number of charges forwarded to the public
prosecutor
40,000 additional charges forwarded to the prosecution council annually -
an increase of 20 percent
Subjective performance measures
Satisfaction with police services Substantial improvement in percentage of citizens that is (very) satisfied
with the most recent contact with the police as measured in the Citizen
Police Monitor (PMB), a substantial improvement is achieving the highest
score attained by that force over the period 1993-2002
Satisfaction with availability of police  Substantial improvement in availability as measured in the PMB survey, a
substantial improvement is achieving the highest score attained by that
force over the period 1993-2002
Measures of internal performance
Timely processing of charges against young,
persistent offenders
80 percent of the charges against (young) persistent offenders should be
forwarded to the public prosecutor within 30 days
Overall efficiency gains Efficiency improvement of at least 5 percent in terms of active police
officers - forces that have a sick leave percentage of lower than 8 percent
can subtract the difference from the 5 percent efficiency improvement
Sickness absence percentage Sickness absence percentage should be reduced from 10 to 8 percent
Quality of emergency and other telephone service To be defined goals for responsiveness to 0900-8844 calls (National
Phone number Police, Landelijk Telefoonnummer Politie), responsiveness
to emergency 112 calls, and the overall quality of 0900-8844 calls 
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reward for performing better than other forces. At the time of our writing, it is unclear how the
benchmarking contest will be designed. 
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7 Anticipating gaming of the performance evaluation
7.1 Aim and structure
The Department’s challenge is to design performance contracts in a way that results in well-
targeted incentives. Success is not guaranteed. Recall the frustration of London police officers
caused by apparently inappropriate performance measures (see Chapter 5).
Performance contracts may not only fail to send the right signal to the police, but may also invite
the forces to distort the signals sent back to the Department. This strategic response to
performance evaluations is called ‘gaming’. Gaming stands for all behaviour that allows the
forces to boost their measured performance but is inefficient from the perspective of the
Department’s objective for the forces. Gaming includes manipulation of performance data, but
also undesirable changes in the way the work is done. Think of a police officer who fines just
about everything in the last weeks of December to meet the annual target number of fines.
Clearly, the Department will need to anticipate on a strategic response when choosing a method
of performance evaluation. In this chapter, we identify the dilemmas related to gaming of
performance evaluations. That will help us to better understand the difficulties facing the
Department.
7.2 Objective performance measures and the tradeoff between incentives and
gaming
Ideally, the Department would hold the forces accountable to outcomes. Outcome measures
such as crime levels and feelings of safety reflect those things that we want to see from the
police. By only including outcome measures in the performance contract, the Department leaves
it to the forces to organize their internal processes and choose a mix of outputs in a way that
contributes most to the desirable outcomes. Such a policy would be in line with the desirable
discretion of the regional police forces (see Chapter 2).
For example, if crime prevention was all the Department cared about, then the ideal measure
would tell us how many crimes have been prevented by the police in that region. This figure
would be related to the force’s budget to compare its performance with that of other regions.
With such a measure, incentives are perfectly aligned with the objectives for the forces.
Moreover, the measure would be under perfect control of the forces. A change in the measure
would unambiguously signal a corresponding change in the performance of the force. 
26 See Van Dijk et al. (2000) for empirical research into the determinants of feelings of safety.
27 Buffer capital will work as long as shocks are truly randomly distributed over time and across forces. In that case,
the noise in the indicator tends to cancel out. Buffer capital will not suffice when some forces are dogged by bad
luck or when all forces are struck by bad luck for a long period of time. To handle these cases, a specific force may
receive additional funds or all forces may receive additional funds to overcome difficulties. Clearly, such a bail out
goes against the idea of rewarding results.
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Why the ideal measure is not available
Unfortunately, outcome measures often do not provide a good picture of police performance.
They tend to be affected by many factors and actors other than the police. Feelings of safety are a
good example. A terrorist attack may be a more important determinant of feelings of safety than
the any policing strategy, see De Mulder (2002).
26 Identifying the contribution of the police to a
change in outcome measures is often unfeasible. For example, attempts to identify the effect of
police work on crime for a country the size of the United States have not been very successful
(see McCrary, 2002), making it virtually impossible to identify an effect at the level of a Dutch
police region. The changing nature of policing also makes it more difficult to evaluate its
outcomes (Travis and Waul, 2002, p. 19). The new commitment to engage in a wider variety of
partners in the development of ‘safety plans’ makes it harder to attribute any successes to the
work of the police.
Why ‘noisy’ outcome measures do not provide much incentive
Including such ‘noisy’ outcome measures in a performance contract would not result in strong
incentives for two reasons. First, making the reward dependent on a measure that is not under
close control increases the risks for forces. Second, such measures increase the information
asymmetry between the forces and the Department.
(a) ‘Noisy’ measures imply higher risk
Noisy performance measurement makes performance contracts more look like a lottery than a
reward for effort. For example, if we notice an improvement in crime levels over one year, the
improvement may or may not be due to the police. If we cannot distinguish between noise and
performance, then performance measurement is not likely to strengthen incentives. After all,
when the return to efforts to fight crime are highly uncertain, the police may decide it is not
worth putting in high effort (assuming risk aversion, see Prendergast, 1999, Section 2).
Offering a higher reward to offset the uncertainty does not fully compensate for the loss in
incentives. At first sight, a higher reward may induce a force to take the risk and put in high
effort. High rewards make a force’s budget strongly dependent on external shocks, however. The
Department may have to let the forces build up some buffer capital to absorb the shocks in the
noisy measures.
27 But that goes at a cost of the power of incentives. 
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(b) ‘Noisy’ measures make it easier to hide behind external factors affecting performance
When performance measurement is noisy, the information asymmetry between the Department
and the forces tends to increase. The forces could use this asymmetry by referring to
‘extraordinary circumstances’ when performance is low (Blumstein, 1999). The forces may ask
the Secretary to overrule the conditions specified in the contract with the argument that some
external actor or factor negatively affected the performance measure. Clearly, the possibility of
hiding behind unfavourable external conditions lowers the power of incentives.
Measures of output and internal performance as substitutes
Given the low incentives resulting from noisy outcome measures, the Department could look for
measures of output and internal performance that are highly correlated with the desired
outcomes. For example, the number of breathalyser tests for drivers could contribute to the
outcome of greater traffic safety. The number of tests is a measure the police can do something
about. It is a controllable performance measure. There is a clear link between effort and
performance. In other words: the power of incentives is higher.
Clearly, such measures have to be used with caution since they intervene in the ‘internal
machinery’ of the forces. By using output measures and measures of internal performance, the
Department prescribes the best way of achieving the outcomes. Measures of internal
performance intervene even deeper in the internal optimization processes than output
measures. In both cases, the information asymmetry between the Department and the forces
makes it hard to write such ‘prescriptions’.
Moreover, the forces may take advantage of this information asymmetry by looking for the
easiest way of meeting the Department’s wishes (so called gaming). In police work, the easiest
way of producing output or increasing internal performance is often not the best way.
Unsurprisingly, experiences in New Zealand show that the easiest way of increasing the number
of breathalyser tests is not likely to be in line with the objectives for the police. At the end of
1998, Wellington traffic police had carried out nowhere near the number of breathalyser tests
that it was contracted to perform. To meet its contractual obligation, the police brought
Wellington to a standstill, breathalysing almost everyone in a motor vehicle (UK Parliament,
1999). Another example of a performance measure that can easily be gamed is the number of
fines (to be discussed in the next chapter).
Baker’s principle
Baker (2002) addresses this regularity between controllability and gaming (we abstract from
data manipulation for now, we deal with this issue later in this section). Based on this article, we
formulate Baker’s principle: When holding an organization accountable to performance measures 
28 Assuming that substitution between tasks is possible. If tasks are complementary, an incomplete contract will









Many possibilities Few possibilities
Towards measures of output
and internal performance
Outcome measure
(e.g. level of crime)
(i.e. when keeping the incentive structure constant), more controllable performance measure - that
provide stronger incentives - are more likely to result in undesirable behavioural effects. Many
interviewees emphasized the relevance of this principle to the case of policing. Figure 7.1
illustrates the tradeoff graphically.
 
Figure 7.1   Baker’s principle: the tradeoff between controllability and gaming
How could controllable measures reward the wrong behaviour?
In the case of policing, controllable measures of output and internal performance only reflect
some dimensions of police work. When only some of the efforts contributing to the outcomes of
police work are rewarded, the forces gain from substituting away from tasks that do not produce
measurable results to tasks that do.
28 After all, if the incentives are effective, then the forces are
more likely to work on tasks that do contribute to the performance measures than on tasks that
do not.
Low measurability of the output of some activities is one of the reasons why performance
measures do not capture all of the dimensions of police work. Such measures can lead to a bias
towards activities that can be quantified at the expense of activities that cannot so easily be
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outputs, the performance measure may not cover all dimensions of output. Consequently, the
forces could be tempted to shirk on quality of their services (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
How does the police compare to other sectors?
Capturing all of the essential dimensions in objective performance measures is particularly
challenging in the case of policing. Not only is the police engaged in many activities ranging
from assistance at traffic accidents to resolving a hostage stand off, each individual activity
involves many different dimensions as well. The problem is more complex that in the case of,
say, welfare-to-work services (see Vollaard, 1999). These services are aimed at an easily
observable outcome: placement into jobs. The tradeoff is still valid. Performance measures that
account for the quality of the job placement tend to be less controllable. For example, the
duration of a job is not completely under control of a job consultant. However, the tradeoff
between the power of incentives and possibilities for gaming will be more favourable in the case
of welfare-to-work services than in the case of policing. Figure 7.2 illustrates the difference
between the two sectors. Say that the shaded part shows the allowable area from the
government’s perspective. Within this area, an agency has reasonably strong incentives without
all too many possibilities for gaming. Some performance measures for welfare-to-work services
are within the shaded area, whereas there are no such measures for policing.
Figure 7.2   Comparing policing to welfare-to-work services 
29 Not all crime allegations end up as crime report. After all, in many instances police officers will not be content to
file a crime report without clear supporting evidence that the offence has been committed. Even if there is
reasonable evidence that an offence has been committed, but the complainant refuses to press a charge (as in
many cases of non-stranger violence), then there is a general reluctance to make any crime record at all (Burrows
et al., 2000, p. 68).
30 Sherman (1998) mentions the removal of three commanders at the New York City police over a five-year period
for improperly counting crime to artificially improve their performance.
31 He continues: ‘We could dramatically reduce our crime rates overnight if we chose to operate recording systems
similar to a large number of other forces who, on the face of things, appear to have a rosier crime picture than us.’
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Data manipulation as additional problem
Measures the police ‘can do something about’ tend to be more often administered by the police
themselves. Controllable performance measures are even less attractive if they are prone to
manipulation of data. With strong incentives, it is very tempting to present a rosier picture of
the situation. Clearly, close control over data collection within the force is a precondition for
successful manipulation. Relative performance measurement creates a particularly strong
incentive to manipulate data. After all, it is hard to stay behind if everyone else is manipulating
its data. Why miss out on a reward just because another force is showing unethical behaviour?
As we will discuss in Chapter 8, there are ways to (partly) get around the problem of data
manipulation (such as relying on third parties for data). Therefore, data manipulation may not
be as much a driver of the ‘inescapable’ tradeoff between incentives and gaming as the multi-
dimensional nature of police work.
Police data, crime statistics in particular, are known to be highly manipulable. Methods to
manipulate crime data include (a) influencing the inclination to register crime by showing a lack
of responsiveness, (b) not recording a crime allegation (Bovenkerk, 2002, p. 11, 12)
29, and (c)
creative counting. 
30 The ‘crime mix’ can be manipulated by selectively recording crime
allegations and altering the classification of reported crimes.
An example of the dilemma of data manipulation is the moral outrage of David Swift, Deputy
Chief Constable of the British force Staffordshire. His force ended third worst in a league table
published by ‘The Observer’. However, Swift claimed that Staffordshire’s low ranking was not
due to low performance but to operating ‘the most ethical crime recording system in the
country’ (Staffordshire Police, 2001).
31
Manipulation is not limited to crime statistics, however. For example, the Amsterdam police
tried to bring down their sickness absence rate from 13.0 percent - the highest of all police forces
- to a more favourable 6.9 percent (Het Parool, January 6, 2003). When the Interior Department
checked the reported absence rate, it found that the definition of a sick person had been altered. 
32 The ‘judicial satisfaction survey' include indicators of fairness, appropriateness of charges, sufficiency of
evidence, presentation of evidence and knowledge of the law and advocacy. 
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Contrary to the policy followed by other forces, long-term ill people and people who are partly
disabled had been excluded. 
7.3 Shifting from objective to subjective performance evaluation
Given the multi-dimensional nature of police work and the importance of quality of police work,
the tradeoffs related to the available objective performance measures may not provide for
satisfactory choices in the case of policing. If this is indeed the case, then the Department may
have to look into subjective performance assessment. As we will discuss below, subjective
performance assessment allows a better position on the tradeoff between incentives and gaming.
Subjective assessments can either be conducted by experts or by customers. Peers are the best
experts. As described in Chapter 3, peers are involved in audit teams and review committees that
assess quality management of forces. They could critically evaluate the approach taken by a
force. Clearly, their assessment cannot be translated in some quantitative performance measures
(more on this issue in Chapter 10). Customers include citizens and businesses, but also the
prosecution council. For example, in New Zealand, Judges’ satisfaction with police services is
measured on a yearly basis (New Zealand Police, 2002).
32 In the Netherlands, citizens’
perceptions of police are surveyed bi-annually (Citizen Police Monitor, PMB).
Why would subjective performance assessment lead to better-targeted incentives?
The attraction of subjectively determined measures of performance is that they allow a more
complete picture of performance to be attained, not possible with objective measures. By
including more of the dimensions of the work into the evaluation, subjective assessment limits
possibilities for gaming. Given its multi-dimensional nature, this feature is of particular
relevance to evaluating police work.
Moreover, in light of the tradeoff discussed in the previous section, subjective performance
measures incite the right response without losing all the power of incentives (as tends to happen
in the case of outcome measures that are in line with the Department’s objectives). For example,
businesses state that the determinants of their satisfaction with police services include speed of
recording a crime, the capability to solve the problem at hand, and courtesy in contacts with the
police (Visser et al., 2002b, p. 64).  These are all things the police can do something about.
There may not always be one-to-one link between efforts and performance. Customers may have
difficulty assessing a monopolist. They cannot easily compare the performance of several police 
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forces, making it difficult to assess their performance. Very poor performance or very high
performance is likely to be picked up in the evaluation though. Assessment by citizens may also
be somewhat noisy if their perceptions are influenced by media reports about police actions
elsewhere.
A commonly observed response to subjective assessment, gaming of the evaluation by either the
evaluator or the evaluated party, may not be as problematic in the case of policing:
• Gaming by the forces. Inefficient behaviour just to please the evaluator does not seem to be much
of a problem (think of the salesman who gives too much price brakes ‘to please customers’, so
called ‘rent-seeking behaviour’, see Prendergast, 1999, section 2.2.3). For example, efforts aimed
at the abovementioned drivers of satisfaction stated by businesses would be in line with the
Department’s objective of ‘efficient, effective, fair and decent policing’. Moreover, subjective
measures are not susceptible to data manipulation. By definition, the Department relies on third
parties for performance data.
• Gaming by the evaluators. A number of problems related to gaming by evaluators have been
highlighted in the literature, ranging from ‘leniency bias’, where evaluators are reluctant to give
bad ratings, and ‘centrality bias’, where evaluators compress ratings around some norm rather
than truly distinguishing good from bad performance (ibid.). The assessments by citizens or
public prosecutors are not likely to be tainted by such hidden agendas. They are likely to give
honest responses. It may be more of a challenge to guarantee objectiveness of experts when
assessing the police (think of the peer review briefly discussed in Section 3.2). After all, experts
tend to be not only well-informed but also well-known in the field. If the peer review is not
properly designed, social pressure could possibly result in biassed evaluations.
Another common problem with subjective assessment - inherent biases in the perceptions of
evaluators - does not seem to be prohibitive either. Evaluators may not take all dimensions of
police work into account. For example, citizens may be biassed towards visible aspects of
policing such as street patrols. Therefore, using citizen surveys to assess overall police
performance may lead to an undervaluation of not-so-visible police work. An indication of such a
bias is the claim of some criminologists that the current emphasis on ‘visible blue’ (‘blauw op
straat’) is not justified given the under-investment in criminal investigations (see Boom, 2002).
By limiting the assessment to only those parts that are relevant to that specific group of
customers, such biases can be limited. Additionally, since citizens are not directly faced with the
costs of police work, they may not be fair evaluators. Someone who directly pays for a service
will weigh costs and benefits. However, someone who does not face the marginal costs may put
an unrealistic demand on police services (see also Chapter 2 on the need to ration the supply of 
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police services). Part of this bias may be overcome by comparing citizen satisfaction ratings over
time and/or across regions. Benchmarking provides the way out.
7.4 Conclusions
Holding the police forces accountable to results may not be as easy as it sounds. Outcome
measures such as the level of crime are not quite measures the police can do something about.
Using measures of output and internal performance that are correlated with the outcomes
instead may lead to undesirable effects. The forces may inefficiently focus on ‘meeting the
numbers’ at the cost of other police work and the quality of output. In the case of policing, there
do not seem to be objective performance measures that both invite the right behavioural
response and are also controllable. Therefore, the Department may wish to rely on more
subjective assessment of police performance by customers and peers. Subjective assessment
includes many more dimensions of police work in the evaluation. The police can also do
something about the appreciation of their work by customers and peers. Keeping these
dilemmas in mind, we will have a closer look at the proposed performance contracts in the next
chapter. 
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33 There is no hard evidence on the number of measures management can handle. The measures used for own
purposes by a district chief of police was not smaller (interview Marc Jacobs, see Annex 2) - although this practice
may be partly the result of the Department’s requirements.
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8 Effectiveness of the proposed performance contracts
8.1 Aim and structure
Now that we have described the outlines of the performance contracts and the difficulties related
to evaluating police performance, we will assess whether the contracts are likely to be effective.
We judge the effectiveness by the objectives stated in Chapter 2: the forces should reduce crime,
promote safety and reduce disorder in an efficient, effective, fair and decent manner. In the
following three sections, we will look into three dimensions of contract design: (1) performance
evaluation, (2) collection of data, and (3) design of the performance rewards. Instead of ending
each individual section with a set of conclusions, we will bring together all the findings in the
concluding Section 8.5.
8.2 Assessing the proposed method of performance evaluation
How does the Department deal with the dilemmas in evaluating police performance discussed
in Chapter 7? In the first two sections, we discuss the likely behavioural response to the
evaluation of efforts to reduce crime and to promote safety and reduce disorderly behaviour.
Then we deal with measures aimed at both objectives. Before assessing the individual measures,
we note that have no indication that the total number of measures is excessive in the sense of
creating a lack of focus for management.
33 
8.2.1 Measuring efforts to reduce crime
There are two performance measures related to the aim of reducing crime included in the
performance contracts (see Table 6.1):
• One output measure: number of charges forwarded to the public prosecutor per year.
• One measure of internal performance: timeliness of forwarded charges against (young) persistent
offenders. 
34 Ironically, the more crime, the more charges, and the better the police seems to be able to perform. The number
of charges is less influenced by external conditions than one might think, however. Because of a lack of resources,
there is an excess supply of cases that could probably be solved but are ‘put on the shelf' (the 80,000 ‘plankzaken',
see TK27834, nr.2). If the police is able to shift resources to criminal investigations, then the number of charges
forwarded to the public prosecutor is under control of the police - at least within certain bounds. Actually, the
target of 40,000 additional charges in the national police covenant is directly based on an estimate of the number
of ‘shelved cases' that can be solved.
35 The less controllable outcome measure ‘feelings of safety' that was part of the system of performance rewards
(see Annex 1) has not been included in the performance contracts. During the contract negotiations, the police
forces indicated that they did not want to be held accountable to a measure that they do not have under control
(interview Department of the Interior).
36 In the system of performance rewards, there was the measure ‘percentage of charges dismissed because of
inconclusive evidence' (see Annex 1). This measure has not been adopted in the national police covenant.
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Reducing crime is made synonymous to the number of charges produced by a force.
34 Both
measures focus on efficiency. The more efficient a force operates, the higher the number of
forwarded charges and the faster charges are being forwarded to the prosecution council.
Implicit assumption is that being efficient in these two tasks implies higher effectiveness of
regional police work.
The chosen output measure, the number of charges, is under close control of the forces.
35 To
increase the number of charges, the police can allocate more resources to criminal investigations
or try to work more efficiently. In line with our argument in Chapter 7, strong incentives to
increase the number of charges could compromise the quality of police work (possibilities for
data manipulation are limited by relying on the prosecution council for data).
Less importance attached to sound evidence?
The forces may be induced to also forward cases with rather poor evidence to the public
prosecutor (see ‘Afrekenen op prestatie leidt tot bureaucratie’, NRC Handelsblad, January 3,
2003). The performance contract does not include a measure reflecting the quality of evidence to
redress such a bias.
36 A subjective assessment of police performance by public prosecutors is not
part of the performance contract either. There are countervailing powers that put a restraint on
gaming, however. The larger offices of the prosecution council second employees to police
stations to check the quality of the charges (‘Secretaris op locatie’). Cases without insufficient
evidence are filtered out. The temptation to game the evaluation remains, however. The
(financial) incentives are based on the measures of the Interior Department after all.
Possible bias towards easiest charges
A focus on the easiest charges inflates performance, but is not an efficient way to reduce crime.
This bias could be limited by attaching weights to charges that reflect the severity of the case. 
37 For example, Australia includes ‘death in police custody and custody related operations', ‘complaints per
100,000 people and per 100 sworn police staff' to complete the picture of police performance (see Chapter 9).
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The output measure ‘weighted solved crimes per officer’ introduced by Wiebrens (2002) does
just that (see Section 4.4). No such weights are used, however. Maybe the forces did not want to
be held accountable to a measure that is somewhat more noisy. After all, the prosecution council
also has influence on the conviction of charged individuals (the council needs to ensure
sufficient capacity in the courts and the public prosecutors need to do their work well too). There
are other countervailing powers that may limit gaming, however. The prosecution council
requires the forces to use a tool that indicates the severity of the offence and the likelihood of
solving the case (Openbaar Ministerie, 2003). With that tool, the council decreases the
information asymmetry - and therefore increases its say over the crime fighting efforts of the
police.
Fair and decent policing out of the picture
The number of charges does not reflect the objective of fair and decent crime fighting (neither
does the measure for timeliness). Apparently, the Department does not think that the incentive
to increase the number of charges may go at a cost of fair and decent policing. This policy is at
odds with practices in Australia and the United Kingdom.
37 It is uncertain whether this is a
deficiency within the Dutch context.
Undervaluation of pro-active policing
The police does not only produce charges against offenders, it is also the police’s objective to
prevent crimes from occurring. Indeed, the risk of getting caught prevents crime, but it is not
the only way of preventing crime. There are also so-called ‘pro-active approaches’, including
patrolling the streets and crime prevention campaigns (watch out for pickpockets, lock your
doors, etc.). These activities are neither reflected in a greater number of charges nor in other
performance measures included in the contract. Consequently, pro-active policing may be
undervalued.
Prescribing improvements: timeliness of charges against (young) persistent offenders
In addition to one output measure, the contract also includes a measure of internal
performance: the timeliness of forwarded charges against (young) persistent offenders. The
Department is convinced that faster processing of these specific charges is the most expedient
way of increasing the effectiveness of police work in all of the regions. More specifically, the
Department assumes that (a) young, persistent offender should be given priority over other
cases and (b) timely processing of charges is specifically important to reduce crime. We do not
know the specifics of the empirical evidence that could justify this policy (better crime 
38 The noisy measure ‘quality of living in the neighbourhood’ which was part of the performance rewards (see
Annex 1)  has not been included in the national police covenant (for empirical research into the determinants of the
perceived quality of living see Van Dijk et al., 2000).
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prevention does not seem to be a good argument for this policy, see Bosker, 1997). Apparently,
the other performance measures are thought to provide too little incentive to focus on (young)
persistent offenders. We did not find indications that the forces can easily game this
performance measure. If speeding up charges is the best way of improving police performance,
then this performance measures may indeed contribute to better policing.
8.2.2 Measuring efforts to promote safety and reduce disorderly behaviour
There are several performance measures related to the aim of promoting safety and reducing
disorderly behaviour (see Table 6.1):
• One output measure: number of fines per year.
• Several related measures of internal performance: quality of telephone services.
• Two subjective performance measures: citizen satisfaction with police contact and police
availability.
In this section, we will discuss each of the types of performance measures.
Frivolous fining
The number of fines is the ultimately controllable performance measure.
38 As we already
indicated in Chapter 7, this measure also invites gaming. Indeed, the forces may inefficiently
increase the number of fines in two ways. First, the police may be induced to substitute
warnings and other informal ways of resolving situations with fines. Such a substitution may
not necessarily be desirable. If it were desirable, then such a decision should preferably made at
the local level. After all, police work relies heavily on the discretionary power of the officers to
resolve situations (see Chapter 2). Second, police officers could fine ‘the easy way’ to inflate their
performance. For example, an additional check on seat belt use may be a low-cost solution to
inflate performance. The cheapest way of fining is not likely to be the most desirable way.
Therefore, the number of fines is not likely to contribute to well-targeted incentives aimed at
promoting safety and reducing disorderly behaviour.
Telephone services
The Department also includes measures of internal performance reflecting the quality of
emergency and other telephone services. The Department is convinced that improving quality of
telephone contact is an expedient way of promoting safety and reducing disorderly behaviour. 
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We do not know all of the empirical evidence, although evaluations have shown serious
shortcomings in the service in the past, see Nationale Ombudsman (2001). The measures does
not seem to allow for much gaming. Therefore, we conclude that this measure could be a useful
way of creating a more complete picture of police performance.
Rewarding citizens’ satisfaction with police services
The reliance on subjective assessment by citizens is not surprising given the relatively low
measurability of the outputs of community policing and emergency services. As we discussed in
Chapter 7, subjective performance measures provide relatively well-targeted incentives without
losing all the power of incentives as happens in the case of outcome measures.
8.2.3 Measuring efforts directed at both objectives
There are two measures of internal performance that contribute to both objectives: the sickness
absence percentage and overall efficiency savings.
Sickness absence
The rate of sickness absence reveals something about the efficiency and the ‘health’ of an
organization. The focus on sickness absence is supported by the current level of sickness
absence of about 10 percent and the fact that manpower accounts for some 75 percent of total
costs of the police (some British police forces have a sickness absence percentage of about 6
percent, for an overview see Arnott and Emmerson, 2001). Additionally, Verhoeven et al. (2002,
p. 135) find that the police invests little in lowering the rate of sick leave compared to the private
sector. Given the current levels of sickness absence, these low investments are not justified by
great returns to effort. Therefore, the focus on sickness absence may well be justified. Clearly,
the importance of this issue also depends on the starting point of a force: if sickness absence is
already low, then further decreases may be very costly. The Department seems to built in a floor
of 8 percent. If a force goes below the 8 percent, then it can subtract the difference from the
required efficiency improvement of 5 percent (see Table 6.1).
Overall efficiency savings
The measure ‘overall efficiency savings’ is a direct indicator of improvement in efficiency.
Targets for efficiency savings are force-specific: the required efficiency improvement is
dependent on their success in reducing sickness absence. An efficiency savings operations
explicitly mentioned in the national covenant is better resource management (mainly scheduling
manpower). This is a logical suggestion given the recent findings of the General Accounting
Office (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 25, 26). They find that current resource management
of the forces is not based on any analysis of crime and other problems within their region. It is
unclear how these ‘overall efficiency savings’ will be measured, however. Activity measurement 
39 The British authorities were facing a similar problem. As a solution, they summoned the Inspection to verify
claimed efficiency savings through detailed assessments (Home Office, 2002).
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is underdeveloped. It will be hard to show how, for example, better resource management has
resulted in increased efficiency. Without better activity measurement the efficiency savings may
be based on guess work, and therefore be susceptible to manipulation.
39
In this section, we assumed that the data are reliable (apart from manipulation) and that targets
and rewards are set right. In the following two sections, we will explore collection of data and the
setting of targets and rewards.
8.3 Assessing collection of data
Without proper data, performance contracts cannot be implemented. Clearest evidence of the
importance of good data is the failure of the performance rewards discussed in Chapter 6. The
system of performance rewards never got off the ground due to measurement error (although
the system may have been stillborn for other reasons as well). In this section, we discuss the
Department’s efforts to collect the data supporting the new performance contracts. We discuss
how measurement error weakens incentives first.
Measurement error weakens incentives
Measurement error weakens incentives just like noisy performance measurement does.
Non-uniform and incorrect collection of data also introduce noise in the performance measures.
In that case, the forces are held accountable to measures that do not fully reflect their
performance. Consequently, the risk that high effort does not result in higher performance (and
a reward) blunts incentives (assuming risk aversion). Moreover, measurement error allow the
forces to hide behind ‘technical and administrative issues’ when their performance is sub par. In
its extreme form, measurement error will make any performance evaluation impossible (as has
been the case over the last years).
Measurement error may also lead to frustration, which undermines the intrinsic motivation to
improve performance. For example, police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond reacted angrily when
differences in counting crimes negatively affected its place in the crime clear-up rate ranking
published by Netherlands Statistics (CBS). 
Problems concentrate in police data
Given the patchwork of information systems across police regions and the sorry state of these
information systems (KBB, 2002), measurement error is particularly problematic for police 
40 BZK (2002d, p. 6): “The non-allocated performance budget of 2002 (EUR 10m.) has already been spent on
increases in manpower which are part of the 2003 budget.” Translated from: “Het vrijvallende prestatiebudget in
2002 (EUR 10 mln.) is reeds opgenomen in het budget 2003 voor sterkte-uitbreiding”. 
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data. On a scale of one to ten, the forces mark reliability of their data six (In ‘t Veld et al., 2001,
p. 87). Cited causes of data unreliability include lack of user friendliness of the recording
systems and lack of uniformity to properly enter the facts. To indicate the size of the problem:
the forces stated that recorded crime would be reduced by 10 percent when police data would be
properly cleaned (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 33). 
Unreliability of police data has been an issue for a long time. Algemene Rekenkamer (2003a, p.
36) notes that the very same problems of data quality were identified in a similar study in 1995.
The structural unreliability of data is another indication that performance improvement has little
priority. After all, best practices can only be identified when keeping track of operations.
Actually, the system of performance rewards created perverse incentives for the forces not to
improve their information systems. Low data quality did not allow for legitimate payment of the
performance rewards - but the forces received the performance rewards anyway.
40 The national
police covenant has only mention of future agreements between the Department and the forces
on the data quality issue without mentioning deadlines - although expectations of firm
agreements were created in BZK (2002d).
Concerns limited through reliance on third parties
To circumvent the problems with police data, the Department relies as much as possible on
third parties for performance data, including the prosecution council and the Centraal Justitieel
Incassobureau (Central Collection Agency). The subjective assessment of police performance is
based on a population survey, which is conducted uniformly across the country. There still are a
few items that are based on police data, including the sickness absence percentage and the
quality of telephone services. Apart from some concerns about manipulation (think of the
artificially low rate of sickness absence in Amsterdam discussed in Section 7.3), we have no
indication that non-uniform and incorrect collection of data pose major problems for these
items. Therefore, measurement error does not seem to undermine the incentives resulting from
the performance contracts.
8.4 Assessing the proposed design of the performance rewards
Based on the performance measures, the Department defines targets that the forces should
achieve to get the performance reward. There are three common problems related to setting
targets and rewards: (1) individual targets are set too high or too low, (2) comparing and 
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rewarding performance relative to other forces (so called yardstick competition), and (3) the
chance that strong financial incentives put low performers in a negative spiral.
8.4.1 Setting performance targets
Performance targets are threshold values of performance measures above which a force is
awarded the financial bonus. There are some serious challenges to setting targets and rewarding
efforts in the case of policing. After discussing these challenges, we assess the proposed targets.
First challenge: setting targets at the right level
Setting targets at the right level requires knowledge of the way the police operates and
knowledge about the environment in which they operate:
• Information about internal processes. For example, the Department has to judge whether it is
reasonable to demand 40,000 additional charges to be forwarded to the public prosecutor. Such
information will be hard to obtain, since the forces may not have the data themselves.  Activity
measurement is underdeveloped and so is resource management (Algemene Rekenkamer,
2003a). Given the general lack of good information on business processes within the police, it
will be very hard to set the targets right.
• Information about the environment. Targets need to be related to reality. The contracts deal with
problems like crime that are to a great extent driven by forces external to the Department and
the police. Without a clear connection to reality, police work would be supply-driven.
Whether targets strengthen incentives depends on whether they are set just right, too low or too
high. If the target is set right, it is within reach of the force that puts in high effort. In that case,
high effort will lead to an appropriate reward. If the target is too low, the force may stop putting
in high effort as soon as the target has been achieved. If the target is too high, the force may
decide not to put in high effort since the reward is not within reach anyway. Given the lack of
good information discussed above, it is unlikely that the target will be set just right. Whether a
target is set right also depends on the size of the performance reward. After all, if the cost of
additional effort exceeds the reward, the force has no incentive to put in high effort.
Second challenge: handling multiple targets
Clearly, the Department does not set one single target. With multiple targets, the problem is
how to weigh each measure. Is there are a specific reward for meeting every single target? If so,
is the reward equal for all the targets? Or is there a rule how many of the targets have to be met
as condition for receiving the reward? The system of performance rewards had a rather arbitrary
way of allocating the performance rewards. The forces had the flexibility to do well on the 
41 The police employs some 50,706 FTEs, 75 percent of which are active personnel. Some 50 percent of their time is
spent on back office work, training, etc. About half of the remaining time is spent on community policing and
emergency assistance (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, p. 47). That leaves us with 9,507 officers who could fine
people. Therefore, 180,000 additional fines implies some 19 additional fines per active police officer. To compare:
Terpstra (2002, p. 50) mentions 160 fines per officer annually as a goal set by a local police department. In that
case, 19 extra fines implies an increase of about 12 percent, which is in line with the 15 percent mentioned in BZK
and Justitie (2003).
42 Back-of-the-envelop calculations learn that 40,000 additional charges would probably take about 500 FTEs
(including management and support), whereas the number of FTEs will be increased by 4,000.
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measure of choice. Moreover, no weighting was applied to any of the measures. Clearly, biases
in police work may result if the forces will choose to only work hard on the easiest targets.
The targets in the national police covenant
At this time, we only have information on the overall targets for the individual measures for the
period 2003-2006. These national targets will have to be transformed to region-specific targets
and, maybe, to year-on-year changes. Therefore, we will focus on the national targets for now.
One target that seems to be set rather low is the number of fines and transactions. The target is
to write 180,000 additional fines annually by 2006. This target implies some 19 additional fines
annually per active police officer, which is not a major achievement.
41 The 40,000 additional
charges do not seem to be much of a challenge either - considering the increase in police officers
over the years to come.
42 When these targets have been set too low, then they will not provide
much incentive. The goals for customer satisfaction may also be little ambitious since they are
based on historical performance (‘perform at least as good as you did in the past’). We have too
little information to assess the other targets in the police covenant (such as timely processing of
charges and quality of telephone services). At this moment, it is unclear how the Department
will weigh the different performance measures to allocate the individual performance rewards.
With a fixed number of 40,000 additional charges and 180,000 additional fines per year, an
implicit assumption is that the level of crime and disorderly behaviour will not change over the
period 2003-2006. Clearly, these targets make regional police work more supply-driven than
demand-driven. 
8.4.2 Comparing and rewarding relative performance
The performance contracts include a ‘tournament’ between the forces for extra budget. There
are two design problems related to comparing and rewarding relative performance:
• Accounting for different operating environments. When comparing the performance of forces, the
Department should somehow correct for the different (changes in) external conditions that the 
43 In the system of performance rewards that will be replaced by the performance contracts, each force was put into
a cluster of five comparable forces (based on degree of urbanization). Whether this solution actually works is
uncertain. It is questionable whether external conditions are strongly correlated with the degree of urbanization.
For example, the forces Limburg-Noord and Drenthe are in the same cluster, whereas their regional conditions,
such as changes in the rate of unemployment, may well differ (see Chapter 9 for the interesting way in which the
United Kingdom has tackled this problem). 
44 After Matthew 13:12 and 25:29: “Unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from
him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.”
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regional police forces face. After all, Groningen and Amsterdam-Amstelland will probably face
different ‘external shocks’. When such corrections are not made, the link between effort and
performance is distorted and the power of incentives will decrease.
• Making the financial incentives worthwhile. It will be hard to set rewards at such a level that the
tournament is actually interesting for the forces from a financial perspective. With many forces
competing for a reward, the risk of not receiving the reward increases. The expected reward of
putting in more effort than another force may therefore be rather low (assuming risk aversion).
To compensate for that risk, the reward could be increased. However, high rewards could lead to
high fluctuations in police budgets. These fluctuations are not desirable from the standpoint of
the citizens.
At this time, it is unclear how the relative performance rewards will be allocated. The
Department is still negotiating with the forces about the design of the tournament.
43 The only
thing that is clear is that only 25 percent of the performance budget will be used for the
tournament. Therefore, the relative performance reward may not constitute a major incentive
from a financial perspective.
8.4.3 Strong financial incentives and the possibility of a negative spiral
Strong financial incentives may put the quality and continuation of police services in jeopardy.
High-performing forces earn the rewards, low-performing forces do not and may end up in a
negative spiral of lower performance, less resources, and so on. The negative spiral may be
reinforced by a loss of motivation among the low performers. If they have little to no chance of
winning the reward, then why would they put in high effort? In that case, performance contracts
may lead to a class of failing police forces that have little motivation to improve. This is
undesirable since citizens have no choice other than to consume the police services provided in
their locality. This problem is known as the ‘Matthew effect’.
44 In principle, even with small
financial rewards, these incentives go against the lack of consumer choice. After all, if a force
misses out on a reward because of poor management, citizens will pay twice. They cannot switch
to another police forces other than by moving somewhere else after all. 
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The allocation of only a small part of the police budget (2 percent) is dependent upon
performance. The 2 percent of the budget seems to be the part of the budget that is not already
fixed (interview Frits Vlek). Although these rewards are relatively small, if they tend to be
awarded to the previous winners, a gap between high and low performers may start to appear.
Therefore, the national police covenant emphasizes individual performance rewards rather than
relative performance rewards. That way, the low performers also have a good chance to receive a
performance reward. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the performance contracts will throw low
performing forces in a negative spiral.
8.5 Conclusions
Bringing together the outcomes of the analysis, we conclude the following: considering the way in
which performance is rewarded, the proposed performance contracts are not likely to be uniformly
beneficial to the realization of the Department's objectives for the police forces. Why is it that this
intention may not be fully realized?
• The performance measures only touch on some of the dimensions of police work, inviting the forces to
narrowly focus on ‘making the numbers’. Such a strategic response may compromise the quality of
police work, i.e. those dimensions that are not reflected in the measures. The problems concern
the output measures rather than subjective performance measures (citizen satisfaction) and
broadly defined measures of internal performance (such as the rate of sickness absence). Crime
fighting is made synonymous with producing criminal charges at a high rate. This incentive is
an invitation to also forward cases with questionable evidence to the public prosecutor and to
focus on the offences that are easiest to solve. Moreover, crime prevention may be undervalued
since such efforts are not fully reflected in the number of charges or other measures. Similarly,
increasing the number of fines is an invitation to ‘frivolous fining’.
• Strengthening incentives requires more of target setting than may be possible. Given the lack of
(reliable) information about the internal processes of the forces, setting specific targets for each
individual force is simply too challenging an undertaking. For example, back-of-the-envelop
calculations indicate that the targets for the number fines and charges seem to be too little
ambitious - certainly given the further increase in the number of police officers. Clearly, low
targets do not provide much incentive to the forces.
• Additionally, setting output targets threatens to turns the police into a supply-oriented rather than a
demand-oriented organization. Clearly, fixing output levels at the national level goes against the
forces’ need to react to (changes in) their specific regional environment.
• Instituting financial rewards for meeting targets places financial gain above the public’s wishes, which
likely results in biases in police work. There is little chance that the financial rewards reflect the
social value of each measured dimension of police work. With a smaller number of rewards than 
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performance measures, the measures need to be somehow weighted. There is simply no
information to weigh the quality of telephone services against timely processing of criminal
charges, for example. So far the Department has not been able to find a satisfying solution to
this problem.
Given these shortcomings in the design of the performance contracts, the question is whether
these problems can be fixed. Can performance contracts be made effective - if only we find the
right performance measures, set the right targets and choose the right way of allocating the
rewards? We will address this question in the third step of the analysis. 
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Step III. What is the value of performance contracts for the police?
In Chapter 9, we will provide a brief overview of the policies that are being pursued in Australia and the
United Kingdom. This look across the borders is meant to provide ideas for alternative ways of achieving
the Department’s objectives. Maybe there are alternative approaches that do not have all of the
drawbacks of the proposed performance contracts identified in Chapter 8. Based on the analysis in the
foregoing chapters and the lessons from Chapter 9, we draw conclusions about the value of performance
contracts in Chapter 10. 
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9 Brief overview of policies in the United Kingdom and Australia
9.1 Aim and structure
Increasing accountability and incentives without introducing undesirable side effects; this is the
challenge facing policy makers around the world. The police may be one of the most challenging
sectors to take on. There should be a lot we could learn from countries that have taken the lead
in this area, including Australia and the United Kingdom. In this chapter, we will provide a brief
overview of the policies followed in these two countries. Given the absence of empirical studies
into the actual effects of the policies in these and other countries, the lessons concentrate
around ideas for the design of policies. We will not be able to draw hard conclusions on what
works and what doesn’t. In line with the scope of the study, we focus on the interaction between
the national (federal) level and the regional level. 
9.2 Policies in England and Wales
Subsequently, we describe the organization of the efforts to measure police performance, the
actual performance measures and the way in which the measures are being used.
Organization of the efforts
The National Policing Plan 2003-2006 provides the framework for policies towards the police.
In this document, the Home Office, the British equivalent of the Interior Department, defines
the overarching aims and objectives for the police service. Within these aims and objectives, the
Home Office then defines ‘Ministerial priorities’ that reflect the ‘Home Office Public Service
Agreement’. The Public Service Agreement states what the public can expect from their money
and who is responsible for delivery of targets. The Agreement for the police service requires a
reduction in crime and the fear of crime and an improvement in the performance of all forces.
The national targets are supported by Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPIs).
Under the Local Government Act 1999, police authorities are responsible for securing Best
Value in their region. Authorities must publish an Annual Policing Plan. The Plans provide a
picture of the policing service delivered over the last 12 months; the authority’s plans for next
year; how the authority’s performance has varied over time and compares with others; and how
the views of local people have been taken into account. The Police Inspection (HMIC) reports
publicly on the achievement of targets and compliance with acknowledged good practice. 
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Table 9.1 Best Value Performance Indicators
Corporate health
Achievement of (2 percent) efficiency target as assessed by the Police Inspection (HMIC)
Annual estate running costs (excluding repairs and maintenance) per square meter
Number of complaints per 1,000 officers / Percentage of complaints substantiated / resolved informally
Percentage of the public satisfied with police action in response to 999 calls
Percentage of the public satisfied with the service received at police station inquiry counters
Percentage of victims satisfied with police initial response to a report of violent crime / burglary of a dwelling
Percentage of victims of road traffic collisions satisfied with the police service at the scene
Percentage of police officer strength which is female / of ethnic origin
Percentage of ethnic population of working age
Number of working days lost through sickness per police officer / civilian employee
The percentage of staff turnover of police officers / civilian employees
The percentage of police officers in operational posts / organizational support posts
Number of medical retirements of police officers (civilian employees) as a percentage of all officer (civilian) retirements
Actual net revenue expenditure per 1,000 population
Percentage of Police Authority buildings open to the public which are suitable for and accessible to disabled people
Crime
Level of crime / Fear of crime / Feelings of public safety
Public confidence in the criminal justice system or its component parts
Service delivery outcome
Total recorded crime per 1,000 population / The percentage detected recorded crimes
Domestic burglaries/Violent crimes/ Recorded robberies/Vehicle crimes per 1,000 households
Percentage detected domestic burglaries/violent crimes/robberies/vehicle crimes
Number of offenders dealt with for supply offences in response of class A drugs per 10,000 population
Number of public disorder incidents per 1,000 population
Percentage of all expedited/remand / full files in time limit which are fully satisfactory or sufficient to proceed
Percentage of full youth files to Crown Prosecution Service both within time which are satisfactory or sufficient to proceed
Percentage of expedited/remand youth files which are fully satisfactory or sufficient to proceed
Number of road traffic collisions involving death or serious injury per 1,000 population
Quality
Percentage of incidents requiring immediate response within target / urban target / rural target
Percentage of 999 calls answered within local target response time
Percentage of persons arrested for notifiable offences who where charged/reported for summons or cautioned
Percentage of persons referred to drug treatment programs
Fair access
Number of PACE stop/searches of white persons per 1,000 population
Percentage of PACE stop/searches of white persons leading to arrest / minority ethnic persons per 1,000 minority ethnic pop.
Percentage of PACE stop/searches of minority ethnic persons leading to arrest
Number of substantiated complaints under PACE 96 detainees per 10,000 people detained
Percentage of racist incidents where further investigative action is taken
Percentage of recorded racially aggravated crimes detected
Percentage of domestic violence incidents (with power or arrest) where arrest was made relating to the incident
Percentage of victims of domestic violence who where victims in the previous 12 months
Percentage of domestic burglaries where the property had been burgled in the previous 12 months
Note: For ease of presentation, multiple, similar performance measures are grouped together and separated by a slash. 
45 It is interesting to note that just because one force is ‘most similar' to a second force, this does not mean that
the second force is most similar to the first force: the second force may actually be closer in character to a third
force. For example, one of the ‘most similar’ forces to a metropolitan force might be an urban force rather than a
rural constabulary. However, the urban force might be ‘most similar’ to other urban forces rather than the
metropolitan force (Home Office, 2003, p. 13). 
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Performance measures
There is a long list of Best Value Performance Indicators. The indicators are grouped in five
clusters: corporate health, crime, service delivery outcome, quality, and fair access. Table 9.1
provides an overview.
The use of performance measures
Compliance with the performance measures primarily implied reporting back to the Home
Office, Police Inspection and Audit Commission. To date it has not been possible to pull this
information together to get a clear picture of the overall performance of a force relative to other
forces. There is no link between budgets and performance.
Plans for the future
There are two major policy initiatives. First, the Home Office is developing a method that turns
the long list of performance indicators into a meaningful picture of police performance (the so-
called ‘Policing Performance Assessment Framework’). Six dimensions of police performance
are identified: citizen focus, helping the public; reducing crime; investigating crime; promoting
public safety and resource usage. Based on social and geographical characteristics, each force is
compared to a set of two to nine ‘most similar forces’.
45 Performance monitors will be used to
provide a quick and visual representation of performance in these areas. In February 2003,
interim indicators have been published based on 2001/02 data (see Home Office, 2003). Figure
9.1 shows an example of a performance monitor.
A second initiative is to create a link between police activities and their costs by 2003/04.
Nationally, a system of Activity Based Costing is being introduced. The idea is to use this
information to benchmark the forces on their ‘value for money’. Based on the outcomes, explicit
incentives may be introduced. In the National Policing Plan it says: “The funding regime will
need to response to these developments. The scope for best performing police authorities/forces
gaining greater freedom to manage their finances will also need to be examined.” (Home Office,
2002, p. 24). 
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Figure 9.1   Example of a performance monitor
Source: Home Office (2003).
9.3 Policies in Australia
Just as in the last section, we describe the organization of the efforts to measure police
performance, the actual performance measures and the way in which the measures are being
used.
Organization of the efforts
Australia has a long tradition of comparing the performance of police services between states.
The benchmarking efforts are conducted by the Steering Committee for the Review of
Commonwealth and State Service Provision, operating under the auspices of the Council of
Australian Governments. The Committee comprises senior representatives from
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments, and a representative from local government.
The two main tasks of the Committee are to develop national performance indicators for
government services and to analyse service provision reforms. The services covered by the
Committee span education, health, justice, community services, emergency management and
housing. A Police Working Group conducts the work on measurement of police performance -
in coordination with the Police Practitioners Group.
Performance measures
In January 2003, the Committee published the eighth annual ‘Report on Government Services’
(see SCRCSSP, 2003, Chapter 5, national policing functions are not included in the analysis). 
46 Examples of studies that provide input to the police section of the Report on Government Services are: ‘Linking
inputs and outputs: activity measurement by police services’(1999) and ‘Asset measurement in the costing of
government services’ (2001). See www.pc.gov.au/gsp/
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Over many years, the Committee has worked with the states to improve the quality of
performance data and measures. Typically, when there are concerns regarding data
comparability or certain performance measures, the Committee initiates a study.
46 The
performance indicators included in the Report measure how well the state police forces meet the
four key objectives, given their operating environment. The indicators also measure whether
services are provided in an equitable and efficient manner. Table 9.2 provides an overview of the
performance indicators for each of the four key objectives for the police.
A new approach to efficiency measurement
The Police Working Group aims to improve current measures of efficiency (ibid., p. 5.58).
Typically, these measures are in the form of expenditures for an activity. However, in practice it
is hard to attribute costs to one activity. For example, police response to a call for service will not
only deal with the incident at hand, but may increase police visibility and, therefore, provide
public reassurance. Therefore, a new approach to efficiency measurement is to identify
problems of prime importance and the activities required to redress the problems. Measures can
then be made of the time/cost of activities and of the actions resulting from those activities.
The use of performance measures
The authors do not offer any possible explanations for differences in measured performance
between the states (for example, why are Northern Territory’s police expenditures per person
double the national average?). It is up to the critical evaluators to ask demand explanations from
the police. Clearly, lacking a method of assessing relative performance based on these data, no
direct financial incentives are based on these measures. 
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Table 9.2 Report on Government Services Performance Indicators
Key objective (supporting activities) Indicators
Quality, integrity, access and equity
considerations relevant to all key objectives
Percentage of people (very) satisfied with police services (in their most
recent contact)
Percentage of people who (strongly) agreed the police perform their job
professionally
Percentage of people who (strongly) agreed that most police are honest
Complaints per 100,000 people and per 100 sworn police staff
Indigenous staff as proportion of indigenous population aged 20-64 years
Percent female police staff
To allow people to undertake their lawful pursuits
confidently and safely (emergency  assistance;
crime prevention activities; community support
programs)
Proportion of people who felt (very) safe at home (alone during the day and
alone after dark) and in public places (walking or jogging locally after dark,
travelling on public transport after dark)
Proportion of people who consider the identified issues to be a major
problem or somewhat of a problem: housebreaking, drugs, vehicle theft,
driver behaviour, physical assault, graffiti/vandalism, family violence,
louts/gangs, drunken behaviour and sexual assault
Recorded crimes against property and the person and crime victimization
Expenditure per person on community safety and support
To bring to justice those people responsible for
committing an offence (crime investigations)
Proportion of investigations finalized within 30 days and proportion of
finalized investigations leading to offender being proceeded against within
30 days, both for crime against the person and crime against property
Expenditure per person on crime investigation
To promote safer behaviour on roads (road safety
and traffic management)
Reported use of seat belts, speeding and driving under influence
Road fatalities per 100,000 registered vehicles
Land transport hospitalizations per registered vehicle
Cost per fatal or serious injury or collision
Perception of road safety problems in the neighbourhood
Expenditure on road safety and traffic management per person and per
registered vehicle
To support the judicial process to achieve
efficient and effective court case management
and judicial processing, while providing safe
custody for alleged offenders, and ensuring fair
and equitable treatment of both victims and
alleged offenders (services to the judicial process)
Death in police custody and custody related operations
Proportion of guilty findings in lower and higher court cases
Juvenile diversions as a proportion of juvenile offenders
Expenditure per person on services to the judicial process
Real costs awarded against the police in criminal actions
Source: SCRCSSP (2003). 
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9.4 What can we learn from these countries?
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, possible lessons concern ideas for policy rather
than hard evidence on what works and what doesn’t. Based on this overview, we identified the
following features that could be of interest to Dutch policy makers.
Involvement of experts
Interestingly, in both countries the policies have been guided by a group of experts. The United
Kingdom had its Public Services Productivity Panel (see PSP, 2000) and Australia its Steering
Committee for the Review of Commonwealth and State Service Provision (see SCRCSSP, 2002).
The role of experts in these two countries stands in contrast with the Dutch strategy. We are not
aware of any direct involvement of external experts in the design of the performance contracts
for the police forces.
Incentives are based on benchmarking
The requirement to explain differences in performance relative to other forces - rather than the
requirement to meet a number of force-specific targets - is used as source of incentives. Both in
Australia and in the United Kingdom, critical evaluation of relative performance is seen as the
key to improve accountability and to strengthen incentives. Obviously, the policy makers realize
that many of the performance measures are affected by external factors that may differ between
forces. Variation in policing practice is not the only possible reason behind variations. However,
as stressed by John Denham, Minister of State for Crime Reduction, Policing and Community
Safety, ‘variations in policing performance that are highlighted by the comparisons should
prompt questions as to why there is such variation’ (Home Office, 2003, p. 3). The public, and of
course closely involved representatives and government officials, are given the role of critical
evaluators who should motivate the forces to improve their performance.
No financial rewards
It is interesting to see that two countries that are way ahead of the Netherlands in quality and
organization of police performance data shy away from the use of financial rewards. Apart from
the example of asset seizure and forfeiture discussed in Chapter 3, we are not aware of any other
countries that use or have used financial incentives for the police. Again, critical questions based
on comparisons between forces are the source of incentives, not financial rewards for meeting
force-specific targets. Indeed, the United Kingdom is investigating ways of introducing a link
between performance and budgets. But they only do so after many years of improving the
reliability of police data and research into ways of meaningful comparisons between forces.
Moreover, the outcome of these explorations into the use of financial incentives is uncertain (in
the next chapter, we provide some reasons for not using financial incentives in the case of 
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policing). The wish of Dutch policy makers to introduce financial incentives right away does not
seem to be based on superior data (see Section 8.3) or a superior way of comparing forces’
performance (see Section 8.4). 
47 When we use the term government, we mean the national government. In police issues, the Interior Department
often acts as representative of the national government. Therefore, we sometimes explicitly refer to the Interior
Department’s role as principal of the regional police forces (see Section 1.4).
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10 Conclusions
10.1 Aim and structure
Are the problems identified in the second step of the analysis just growing pains of a new policy
instrument? Or are there more fundamental problems with performance contracts for the police
forces? What are options to proceed - and can we use any of the lessons from policies pursued
elsewhere? All these questions address the value of performance contracts for policing, the issue
that we will address in this last chapter. Before going into this issue, we first reiterate what goals
performance contracts might serve.
10.2 What goals might performance contracts serve?
By holding out the prospect of financial rewards for meeting a set of pre-determined targets, the
government wishes to improve the accountability of the regional police forces and strengthen
their incentives to work in an efficient, effective, fair and decent manner.
47
The scope for improvement
The scarce empirical evidence on police performance indicates that there is scope for
improvement. Data from the prosecution council shows that there are great differences in
performance between the forces. This finding indicates that the forces operate as ‘islands’ rather
than as ‘partners in crime’ who share best practices. Moreover, no upward trend in police
performance can be discerned over the last ten years. To the contrary, the steady increase in the
number of police officers has been accompanied by a dramatic decline in efficiency. These
findings are consistent with the idea that the police forces do not systematically improve their
policing strategies through carefully evaluated experiments. Unfortunately, many of the rich
sources of administrative data of the forces have not been opened up yet. Consequently, little is
publicly known about the way police budgets have been spent or the results of police work. It is
unclear what is behind the decline in measured efficiency. Is the police unable to cope with
changes in crime patterns and disorderly behaviour? Or are police officers choked by an ever-
increasing administrative burden and a lack of capacity upstream in the criminal justice system?
The lack of interest in empirical studies into police efficiency and effectiveness alone is an
indication of the low importance attached to understanding and improving police performance. 
48 The prosecution council tries to put a brake on undesirable responses in the area of crime fighting by using its
own performance measures, prescribing desirable behaviour and seconding employees to police stations
(‘secretaris op locatie’). The temptation to game the evaluation remains, however. The (financial) incentives are
based on the Interior Department’s performance measures after all. Other performance measures included in the
contract do not provide a sufficient check on gaming either.
100
The Interior Departments’ challenge
The Interior Department’s challenge is to find a policy instrument that improves the forces’
accountability and incentives, but does not interfere with the discretion of the forces. The great
degree of discretion of the forces is based on their superior expertise gained through training
and daily experience. The forces, not the policy makers at the Department, know ‘where policing
is all about’ and ‘what is really going on in the regions’.
Performance contracts as seemingly attractive policy instrument
At first sight, entering into performance contracts with the forces seems to be an attractive way
of improving accountability and incentives. Holding the forces accountable to results
acknowledges the information asymmetry between the Interior Department and the forces
regarding the best way to improve performance. Performance contracts combine the two policy
instruments of the Department: exercising oversight and budgeting. The rewards for meeting a
set of targets provide financial incentives that support the forces’ drive to improve. The rewards
compensate the forces for the time and effort spent on evaluating operations and motivating
employees to share and implement best practices. Moreover, the rewards acknowledge the
efforts of police officers and their managers who have to overcome (bureaucratic) barriers to
change and the continuous, strong pressure to respond to the issues of the day.
10.3 Are the proposed performance contracts likely to be effective?
Putting desirable improvements in performance into a contract poses some serious problems in
the case of policing. Considering the way in which police performance is measured and
rewarded, the proposed performance contracts are not likely to be uniformly beneficial to the
realization of the government’s objectives for the police forces. We base this conclusion on the
following findings.
Output measures invite gaming
The output measures - the number of fines and the number of charges forwarded to the
prosecution council - invite the forces to game the performance contract. Gaming refers to
narrowly focussing on ‘meeting the numbers’ at the cost of other dimensions of police work not
included in the contract. When requiring the forces to meet one-dimensional output targets, the
wrong behaviour is also rewarded.
48 The forces are rewarded for substituting away from tasks 
49 For the moment, we assume that meeting the targets included in the performance contracts is equivalent to
improving police performance in the perception of citizens.
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that do not affect the performance measures to tasks that do (at the possible cost of ‘pro-active’
crime prevention). Within activities that affect the measures, the performance contracts also pay
off for focussing on the easiest cases (frivolous fining and picking the easiest criminal charges).
Finally, the forces are rewarded for lowering quality of output (forwarding charges with
questionable evidence to the prosecution council). If the forces are expected to react to the
(financial) incentives, then performance contracts that pay off for behaviour other than what the
government is seeking are not likely to be effective.
Output targets conflict with the forces’ discretion
By putting the desired number of fines and criminal charges in a contract, they are made
independent of changes in the nature, frequency and location of criminal and disorderly
behaviour. Therefore, the demands of performance contracts and reality may well start to
deviate. Such a gap between reality and targets limits the responsiveness of regional police work
to changes in the environment. It is in the government’s interest to provide the forces with the
discretion to decide when to fine someone or when to start a criminal investigation (although
the forces can use decision tools provided by third parties such as the prosecution council). After
all, the police forces have the information to respond to changing regional circumstances.
Financial rewards are a further invitation to gaming
Financial rewards require translating multiple dimensions of police work into one binary
outcome. Allocating the reward is a binary decision after all. Either the force meets the
conditions for reward or it does not. In contrast, police work has many, non-discrete outcomes
such as reassuring citizens and providing assistance at traffic accidents. Weights need to be
attached to all of the different outcomes. It is hard to replace subjective judgement with
mechanical rules, however. When the weights included in such ‘decision rules’ are picked
wrong, undesirable behaviour is rewarded. The forces can be expected to look for the target that
can be achieved with the least effort and the greatest reward after all. At the time of our writing,
it is unclear how the Department will address this challenge. Given its serious shortcomings, the
now-abolished system of performance rewards does not provide much guidance.
Financial rewards conflict with the lack of consumer choice
By not increasing the budgets of forces that did not sufficiently improve their performance,
citizens pay twice for poor police management within their locality.
49 In contrast with schools
and hospitals, citizens cannot switch to a better performing force other than by moving
somewhere else. 
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Performance targets that are off undermine incentives
Back-of-the-envelop calculations indicate that the targets for the number fines and charges seem
to be too little ambitious - certainly given the future increase in the number of police officers.
The goals for customer satisfaction may also be little ambitious since they are based on historical
performance (‘perform at least as good as you did in the past’). In the absence of any firm
knowledge about the means by which the targets could be achieved, each target included in the
performance contract is likely to be either out of reach or too little ambitious. If they are set too
low, the force may stop their efforts as soon as the target is reached (‘satisficing behaviour’). In
the case that targets are too ambitious, the forces also have little incentive to improve
performance. Therefore, the performance contracts may not provide much incentives to
improve performance.
Wish for flexibility at the national level may undermine power of incentives
The government’s wish for flexibility in changing policing priorities and the terms of contract
may undermine the performance contracts’ incentives. In practice, the government frequently
places new demands on the police. Through such interventions the government becomes a
‘co-producer’ who shares responsibility for the results. Therefore, such interventions may lower
the incentives to meet the performance targets. Furthermore, negative experiences with some of
the performance measures may prompt the government to change the terms of contract. In July
2003 the current state of the art of measuring and rewarding police performance will be frozen
into performance contracts. Given the relative inexperience with this new policy instrument -
and the above-mentioned shortcomings in contract design - changes in the terms of contracts
may become desirable. Changes in the terms of contract will undermine the credibility of the
Department as principal, however, and therefore weaken incentives.
To conclude, a closer look at the proposed performance contracts learns that they may not be
entirely effective in advancing the government’s agenda of improving police accountability and
incentives. Strengthening incentives requires more of target setting than may be possible.
Moreover, some performance targets can also be met by strategies that are not in line with the
government’s objectives. Finally, the performance contracts conflict with the desired flexibility at
the regional and national level and the lack of consumer choice. Therefore, it should be
interesting to compare performance contracts with other approaches used elsewhere.
10.4 What are options for policy?
Some of the above-mentioned problems could be alleviated by making a number of changes to
the performance contracts. However, serious drawbacks remain with the contractual approach.
Based on our brief look into policies pursued in Australia and the United Kingdom, we outline 
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an alternative approach that may provide a better fit with the nature of police work and the
desired discretion of the forces.
Some ways of improving upon the proposed performance contracts
Better data, other performance measures and a redirection of financial incentives to police
management could alleviate some of the problems with the proposed performance contracts:
• Search for better performance indicators. Better measures could limit the side-effects and lower the
conflict with flexibility at the regional level. Of all measures included in the contract, the number
of fines and charges most strongly invite the forces to just ‘meet the numbers’. They also limit
the discretion of the forces most strongly. An option is not to include the number of fines in the
contract. The charges can be weighted with their respective penalty. Then the forces no longer
have the incentive to focus on the easiest cases.
• Tie financial incentives to police managers’ remuneration rather than the forces’ budgets. That way,
customers of police services will no longer pay twice for poor police performance.
• Gather better data to improve target setting. Better data on how the forces spend their resources
and what outputs are produced are necessary to make a better informed guess on what the
targets should be. To that end, the rich sources of administrative data of the forces would need
to be opened up.
Serious drawbacks remain
The major difficulty with performance contracts is the need to fix the desired improvements in
police performance in advance. The contractual approach is weak on unexpected behavioural
responses to performance targets and conflict with the necessary flexibility at the regional and
national level. Moreover, thorough assessment of a force’s strategy is impaired since police
performance is reduced to a small number of quantitative performance measures that everyone
can understand. The rules that need to be established to allocate the financial rewards only
worsen these problems. Clearly, these are problems that are inherent to the contractual
approach. They cannot be fixed with better performance measures, targets and the like.
Looking for an alternative approach
Based on our look at policies across the borders in Chapter 9, we distinguish two approaches to
achieving better police accountability and incentives. One approach is to contract desirable
improvements in the performance of the police forces in advance. The Dutch government
largely follows this approach. The other approach is to let customers and peers critically evaluate
achieved results - with an eye on meeting future challenges. The latter approach is more in line
with policies pursued in Australia and the United Kingdom. This approach has also been
vigorously put into practice by William Bratton, former New York City Police Commissioner and 
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currently Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (see Kelling, 1995 for an informative
description). As a conclusion to this study, we will compare and contrast the two approaches and
discuss their likely effectiveness in achieving the government’s objectives for the police forces.
We provide an overview of the key characteristics of the approaches in Table 10.1.
How could a policy based on a ‘critical evaluation of achievements’ look like?
Based on the foregoing analysis of the Dutch initiatives, we have some idea of the ‘contracting
desired changes’-approach. How could a policy based on ‘critical evaluations of achievements’
look like? The basic premise of this approach is that the interaction with customers and other forces
- structured by the government - drives the motivation to improve performance. Customer surveys and
managed peer reviews could be organized to facilitate this interaction.
Customer surveys
Perceptions of customers can be obtained through surveys. Citizens are already being surveyed
through the Citizen Police Monitor (‘Politie Monitor Bevolking’). Business can be surveyed in
line with the questions in Section 4 of the ‘Monitor Bedrijven en Instellingen’, see Visser et al.
(2002a, p. 72). Public prosecutors can be surveyed following the ‘Bevoegd Gezag Monitor’, an
initiative of police force Brabant Zuid Oost. The results of the customer surveys can then be
published in line with the government’s Safety Plan:
Table 10.1 Key characteristics of two approaches to improving police accountability and incentives
‘Contracting desired changes’ ‘Critical evaluation of achievements’
Practical form Performance contracts with financial rewards for
meeting targets
Customer satisfaction surveys (citizens, public
prosecutors, businesses), managed peer review
Source of incentives The requirement to meet pre-determined, force-
specific performance targets
The requirement to explain achieved results
relative to other forces to customers and peers
Type of reward Financial bonus for meeting targets, good publicity
when accomplishments are publicly announced
Remuneration for accountable managers,
acknowledgment by evaluators, good publicity
when accomplishments are publicly announced, 
Role of national
government
Fixing desired changes in a contract Organizing peer reviews and customer
satisfaction surveys
Necessary ingredients ‘Gaming proof’ performance measures, reliable,
non-manipulated performance data, information to
set targets and financial rewards
Unbiased evaluators, reliable and comparable
information on regional situation, policing
strategies and achieved results 
50 Translated from: “Tevens wordt het periodiek publiekelijk bekend maken en vergelijken van resultaten in de
verschillende politieregio’s gerealiseerd.”
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“We will also work towards publicly disseminated comparisons between the performance of the
regional police forces” Justitie and BZK (2002, p. 82).
50.
Subjective assessment allows a more complete picture of performance to be attained, not
possible with objective measures. Each of these groups of customers can provide useful feedback
on the specific part of police services that they are able to assess. Customers are likely to give
their honest opinion about the police in their region. Therefore, the assessment will not be 
tainted by hidden agendas. Most importantly, subjective performance measures are relatively
‘gaming proof’ compared to output measures such as the number of criminal charges. After all,
customers will be on the alert for quality of police work. Moreover, there does not seem to be
much scope for inefficient ‘flattering’ of customers (think of the salesman who gives too much
price brakes ‘to please customers’). For example, businesses state that the determinants of their
satisfaction with police services include speed of recording a crime, the capability to solve the
problem at hand, and courtesy in contacts with the police (Visser et al., 2002b, p. 64). Efforts
that are aimed at these factors are perfectly in line with the government’s objective of efficient,
effective, fair and decent police work. Moreover, these are all things the police can do something
about. There is a clear link between effort and measured performance.
Managed peer review
In addition to customer satisfaction surveys, managed peer reviews are a necessary element of
the assessment. Customers do not look at the interrelations between the complete set of police
activities. Moreover, they may not take into account all of the dimensions of police performance
that are relevant to the government. For instance, customers may not critically review the
efficiency of the police services delivered. Therefore, it is the role of experts to critically assess
the overall strategy of the police force. Peers play a prominent role here, since there are no better
experts than peers. To ensure unbiased evaluations, the peer review could be managed by an
external expert. The managed peer review could probably be built upon the existing peer reviews
that are part of the system of quality management (‘Kwaliteitsstelsel politie’, see Chapter 3). 
A force’s management can be demanded to explain noticeable differences with other forces and
also their plans to address identified problems and new challenges. For example: ‘Your
commercial robberies are high compared to the Haaglanden region. How many of the robberies
are kids stealing cupcakes? How many are guys walking in with Uzis?’ And: ‘Why didn’t you
follow the strategy used in Rotterdam Delfshaven?’ etc. (free after Kelling, 1995). To be able to
answer these questions, a force’s management needs to have a coherent picture of the problems 
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in their region, their strategy to tackle these problems, and the results. Clearly, such a picture
needs to be based on close relations with the rest of the force (‘How did you guys tackle that
burglary problem?’) and sound data. Recent reports by the General Accounting Office show that
major improvements are possible in the management information systems that are necessary to
support this approach (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2003a, 2003b).
Conclusion: contrasting the two approaches
As Table 10.1 already indicated, the two approaches are fundamentally different. In the current
proposals, the financial rewards for meeting a set of pre-determined targets is seen as the way to
improve police accountability and incentives. Following a policy of ‘critical evaluation of
achievements’, the source of incentives is the requirement to answer critical questions about
relative performance from customers and peers. They possess the information to conduct a
thorough assessment of police performance - and to provide ideas about ways to improve. After all,
customers are being served by the police and peers are in the business of policing. Who else is in
a better position to evaluate the forces? Appreciation from customers and peers forms the
reward for achievements rather than financial bonuses from the Department.
This approach acknowledges the discretion of the police at the regional level. The role of the
national government is not to put down desired changes in a contract but to organize the
interaction between a force’s management and their customers and peers. By doing so the forces
are made responsible for presenting a coherent picture of the problems in their region, their
strategy to tackle these problems, and the results. The ability of police managers to be
accountable to - and to learn from - customers and peers can be an input into decisions about
promotion and remuneration. Their performance is assessed based on their professionalism as
police manager rather than on meeting a number of quantitative performance targets. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to look into this alternative approach towards improving
accountability and incentives. The government may be able to better realize its objectives for the
regional police forces. The help of experts and experiences in countries such as the United
Kingdom, Australia and also the United States can be useful in designing and implementing a




This year, the government will enter into performance contracts with each of the 25 regional
police forces. The performance contracts establish a direct link between meeting a number of
quantitative performance targets and financial incentives. A major improvement in police
performance is necessary to meet the objective of 20 to 25 percent less criminal and disorderly
behaviour by 2006.
A closer look at the performance contracts learns that they may not be the most appropriate
policy instrument to achieve this objective. The nature of police work does not allow for advance
planning of outputs. The police consist of professionals who need a high degree of discretion to
do their work. The targets invite adverse behavioural effects. Management could become
focussed on 'meeting the numbers' rather than on delivering results. Because of the wide variety
in police tasks and the low measurability of quality, there is a wide gap between performance
measures and results. The financial incentives make it worse, by forcing a yes/no decision based
on weighing multiple, non discrete performance measures. Moreover, the targets are likely to be
off since the government does not have the information to set them at the right level. Less
financial resources for poorly performing forces also adversely affect citizens. They cannot
choose between providers of police services as in the case of hospitals or schools.
Experiences in Australia and the United Kingdom suggest an alternative approach. They focus
on benchmarking of police forces without direct financial incentives. Both countries have
invested many years in improving the quality and comparability of police data as well as
methods for fair comparisons between forces. Based on these comparisons, police forces are
hold accountable. Consequently, the police are being forced to develop a clear picture of the
effects of their approach in terms of the region's specific problems. The Dutch government
could follow a similar approach. A system of peer review and customer satisfaction surveys can
be instrumental in assessing a force's performance  and in providing ideas for improvement.
Critical assessment of performance data by knowledgeable people is a necessary ingredient to a
policy of holding the police accountable to results. It stimulates a culture of experimenting, data
collection and analysis, and singling out and sharing best practices. Such a change is necessary
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Annex 1. The measures for the system of performance rewards
Performance measures included in the (now abolished) system of performance rewards
Output and outcome measures
Percentage of survey respondents that feel safe
Willingness to report a crime and actual reported crimes per 1,000 inhabitants
Average score on five survey questions on public space (graffiti, harassment by young people, waste, dog dirt, vandalism of
street benches etc. and noise nuisance)
Average score on four survey questions on neighbourhood traffic (road hogs, noise nuisance, accidents)
Number of reported raids on companies/institutions per officer
Number of investigations related to illegal trade, moral law and the environment forwarded to the public prosecutor per officer
1
Number of persons charged in investigations related to illegal trade, moral law and the environment forwarded to the public
prosecutor per officer
Subjective performance measures
Average score on five survey questions on police services (police protects citizens, police has contact with people in the
neighbourhood, police does a good job in the neighbourhood, and the police has an efficient approach to problems)
Percentage of survey respondents that are (very) satisfied with their last contact with the police
Average score on five survey questions on accessibility of the police
Measures of internal performance
Percentage of persons charged with home / street / physical threat-related offences forwarded to the public prosecutor
Number of arrests divided by the number of traffic fines per officer
Number of charged offenders who are forwarded to the public prosecutor per 100 reported offences
Number of underage suspects referred to HALT divided by the total number of underage persons charged with offences
2
Percentage of charges dismissed by the public prosecutor (technical dismissal type 2: inconclusive evidence)
Number of days for processing of reported crimes
Net number of worked days (work days excl. leave, sickness, training) as percentage of gross number of hours of work
Notes: (1) Illegal trade refers to drugs trade, frontier-running, weapons trade and fraud; (2) HALT is aimed at young offenders (12-18 years of
age). They get the opportunity to repair or pay for the damage caused by their behaviour. They can do so by doing supervised work. The program
is targeted at youth involved in vandalism and small theft. 
118 
119
Annex 2. People consulted
The following people were consulted during the course of the study. Additionally, I had a
number of informal conversations with police officers, including Rotterdam-West community
beat officer Th. J. van Asperen. They were helpful in either shaping or testing the ideas and
recommendations in this report, without in any way being responsible for them.
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Sjoerd van Dommelen, Arjen Gielen Ministerie van Financiën Den Haag, September 26, 2002
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Claartje In ‘t Velt, Wouter Stol Nederlandse Politie Academie Amsterdam, October 4, 2002
Caspar Wiebrens Openbaar Ministerie Den Haag, October 7, 2002
Frits Vlek Commissie Politie & Wetenschap Apeldoorn, October 23, 2002
Cas Schreuder Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken
en Koninkrijksrelaties
Den Haag, November 7, 2002*
Frank Bovenkerk Universiteit van Utrecht Utrecht, November 12, 2002
Rob Merten Nederlands Politie Instituut Den Haag, November 25, 2002*
Marlies Burm Algemene Rekenkamer Den Haag, November 26, 2002
Marc Jacobs Politiedistrict Utrecht-Binnensticht Zeist, November 28, 2002
René Goudriaan APE Consultancy Den Haag, February 3, 2003
Benoit Dupont Université de Montréal, Canada Den Haag, February 17, 2003*
Andrew Hughes New South Wales Treasury, Australia Den Haag, February 28, 2003*
Jan Haagsma Andersson Elffers Felix Den Haag, March 7, 2003
Oskar Huurdeman, Esther de Kleuver Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken
en Koninkrijksrelaties
Den Haag, March 10, 2003
André de Jong, Kees Wilmer Ministerie van Financiën Den Haag, March 21, 2003
Jack Riley RAND Corporation Los Angeles, April 18, 2003
Note: (*) Communication by electronic mail.